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CONCLUSIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Chapter I 
PRE-PHILOSOPHICAL CRITERIA OF TRUTH 
Philosophy, all must admit, 1s a hignly refined 
type of human experience, but it doea not, by virtue of 
thts refinement; cease to be human experience-• Conse-
quently, an adequate historical description or phil-
osopny· as an intellectual phenomenon demanda a description 
of the human situation from which it t akes its rise. Men 
believed, men dted, tor their convictions, ages befo r e the 
advent of formal speculation. Men believed in truth long 
before the advent of any reflection deserving or the name 
or philosophy, and our first task shall be to examine why. 
Let us, then, consider those cr iteria of truth accepted 
by human society, both ancient and modern, and attempt to 
reconstruct the r eby the background against which the in-
tellectual drama, whose history is to be t he burdan Of 
. 
this paper, was born, strug-gled, flourished, and expired. 
The pages or history testify that there are prob-
ably no bodies of doctr i ne to which men so tenaciously 
adhere as to the a r ticles of their religious faith. Cer-
t a inly religious truth is very formidable indeed, and 
criteria of religious truth, one suspects, mus t be ex-
ceedingly compelling. 
Mystical experience has been the pr ivilege of only 
a few mystics. The objects of r eligious devotion ar e, at 
least in the more highly ref i ned f a iths, not sensuously 
1 
2 
apprehensible, and men commonly d o not possess sufficient 
log ical pro~ss to deduce the existence of non-tang ible 
1 
de it ies on p urely rational bases. How, then, is the 
t ruth of r e lig ious dogma i mposed? Ecclesias ti cal his-
tory makes one answer plain - authority. The Greeks 
continually app ealed to the authority of the poets, of 
Homer and Hesiod; the Scholastic Doctors turned to the 
Fathers of the Church; and in the conte mporary world 
Roman Catholics accept the authority o f their Pope while 
Fund amentalists make the lite ral interpretation of 
Scripture the foundation of their faith. 
Prominent a~ong the bases of authority are cus t om 
and tradition, due investment, and divine inspiration. 
The first two represent the practical mechanics of tra-
dition and conv ention as crite r ia of truth and have their 
p olitical analo gues. The last, divine inspiration, is 
uniquely a religious criterion of truth. 
The Greeks held the insane in awe and supposed 
epileptics to be divine ly ins p ired. Their seers self-
induced fits with toxins and their utterances were cBre-
fully recorded by scribes. Even the most responsib le 
state officials p laced great trust in the pron ouncements 
u 
of a gurs, magi, and prophets. VVily rulers cont rived mag-
/\ 
leal displays that made their pe rsonal determi nations 
1. Cf. Brightman, IP, 323-324. 
seem like divine intention. Other monarchs slept in 
temples, sacred groves, and other consecrated places 
in the hope that dreams of divine origin would indi-
cate to them the proper conduct of the affairs of state. 
The Gre eks also believed tha t those soon to die were 
granted a moment of divine insight and given the tongue 
2 
of prophecy. Divine manifesta tion r evealed the truth 
accidentally or miraculously, as in the case of Laoco~n, 
or could be induced to do so by the power of human art, 
the latter forming the basis of magic and divination. 
l 
Organized society, like organ ized religion, author-
itatively imposes it s truths upon its members. In some 
social organizations religious and political activities 
mutually intrude, and the chief, who is frequently also 
hig h priest, justifies his sovereignty on the basis of 
divine appointment and his judgments on divine revela-
tion. In other societie s where such relig ious sanctions 
do not ex ist the state and its ministers must support 
their claim to authority by other means. If the state 
be a barbaric one it adopts the si mple expedient of ligui-
dating those who are reluctant to embrace its t ruths. The 
persuasion of the sword, the oubliette, yes, even of mere 
social os tracism, assumes the proportions of a most con-
vincing criterion of truth. In more subtle states the 
forthright sword is replaced as a criterion of truth by 
l. Frankfort et al., BP, 20, 203-206. 
2. Plato, ~pol., 39. 
3 
j urisprudence - not to b e confused with justice. Truth 
is held answerable to law, and reason must bow before 
legality. 
The pre-Socratic philosophers, paying the price 
,JI T! - . 
that all ages i mpose for the social sin of being in-
telligent, i ndependent, and learned, had to contend 
with these evil force s , and those who were refractory 
to the point of remaining loyal to the conclusions of 
their reflections were persecut ed and banished, like 
l 2 3 4 
Xenophanes, Protagoras, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, 
5 6 
or, like Zeno, Pythagoras, and, of course, Socrates, 
martyred. 
Yet the masses are willing to accept s uch abuses 
of t he state for they consider the social homeostas i s 
to be an end worth any price and of far greater value 
t ha n truth. They are only too willing to applaud the 
state's criteria of "truth," and, by way of amplification, 
they are r e ady to add a f ew abuses of their own invention. 
The common man, that is to say the mass man, makes no dis-
t i nction between truth and op i nion. But the coercive 
fo~ce of opinion as a criterion of tru th rests, not on 
the s oundness of its basis, but in the penalty, social 
cens ure and worse, if one f a ils to comply with its die-
tates and i n its sheer weight, for, when an opin ion 
4 
1. Diog. Laert., LEP, II, 425. 4. Digg. Laert., LEP, I, ll~ 3. 
2. Diog . Laert., LEP, II, 465. 5. Diog. Laent., LEP, II, 437. 
3. Dio g . Laert., LEP, II, 381. 6. Diog. Laert., LEP, II, 355. 
gathers ad herents its aut hority, the socia l pressure that 
i t can exert on d issiden ts, correspondingly i ncreases. 
l 
It becomes a custom or trad ition. Custom or tradition 
is the accumul a tive op i n ion of t he masses. 
Now, inasmuch as trad ition does represen t the r e -
pos i t ory Of the r 2"Ce IS e xpe rience' and inaSmUCh aS t he 
cultura l continuity trlUs depends to a large extent upon 
it, tradi tion is certainly wo r t hy of s erious p hiloso phic 
consideration. All art and philosophy t hat is not hope-
l essly precio us mus t have roots e eep in tradition. Art 
and p hilosophy start i n t radition and are necess arily 
voice s o f an a ge and of a soc i al milieu, but the triu:·.p h 
of b6th is to go ·beyond and e xce~d the conf ine s o f tra-
5 
d itional human us a ge. The s peculat ions of the pre-Socrat ic s 
carried them f a r beyond t rad it i on. Yet trad ition supposes 
t ha t those who are not her a l lie s are her enem1es. The 
pre-Socratics fre quently c~~ssedd swords wi th trad ition, 
wit h trad ition's guardian, the state, and with her le g ions, 
t he masses. Accusa tions and persecution were not unknown 
to them. 
A final word a bout tradition- mank i nd, being indom-
itably optimi stic and historically myopic, has always as-
sumed t hat truth ultimately triuwp hs over falsehood, tha t 
eventually, a s if truth possessed a sort o f Darwin ian 
2, 3 
f itness f or sur vival, right wi ll out, or, as THE Phil-
1. Vid. Bri~htman, IP, 37-39. 
2. Cf. Mill, J .S., Q!.! Li b_e_rty , II. 
3. Brad l ey , Art. ( 1911) • 
osopher puts it: 
... things that are true and things that are better 
are, by their nature, practically always easie r to 
prove and eas ier to believe in. 1 
..• men have a suf f icient natural i ns t inct f or what 
is true, and usual l y do arrive at the truth. 2 
..• thin~s that are true and things that are j us t 
have a natural tenden cy to prevail over their op-
posites .•• 3 
This endurance criterion of truth adds credulity to tra -
dition, for, i n the brief span of life g iven to men, tra-
dition is apt to appear very adamant, immutable, and thus 
true. 
The pre-Socratic p hilosophers were all, neve r theless, 
members of soc iety and consequently exposed to the pre-phil-
osophic criteria of truuh employed by organ ized society. 
But they were also men and necessarily i nfl uence d by othe r 
pre- philosophic cri t e r ia of truth which perhaps can be 
designated, for want of a better name, psycholog ical cri-
teria of tru'ah. 
Without a doubt t he criterion of truth mos t venerable, 
of widest and most common applicability, and, i n the popu-
l a r if not i n the speculative mind, g iven most credulity is 
4 
sensation. Just as man has been g iven teeth to chew with 
and limbs for locomotion, he ha s been g iven the senses as 
the instruments es pecia lly designe d for conveying to his 
1. Aristotle, Rhet., 1355a38 . 
2. Aristotle, Rhet., l355al5. 
3. Aristotle, Rhet., l 355a21. 
4. Vid. Br ightman, IP, 42-46. 
6 
intelle-ct the· impres-stons o·f tne external world about 
him. Sensation has been·, it is safe to s peculate, from 
pre-hi storic-, indee-d pre-human, time-s accepted as the 
ultimate crt terion of truth. The pre-Socra ttc phtlo·so-
phers, as will be seen; wer e the first to cast doubt on 
the reliability of sensation as· a criterion of truth 
and to seriously se ek substitutes. A proper apprecia-
tion of the magnitude of their intellectual ac hievement 
demands only a moment's reflection on the power of the 
sway- t ·hat sensation still holds over · the minds of men. 
Yet · t ·b.a-re · are worlds of which · t he eye can only 
guess. Primittv·e man was vaguely aware that the senses 
did not reveal all, that· there· were other forces, other 
worlds - unseen worlds. His experien:ee seemed · to extend 
beyond the realm of s·ense, beyond · his conscious life in-
to m·ore dim realms. i. This invisible; intangible world de-
manded new criteria of truth - instinct, feeling, i ntui-
1 
tion. Due to the very il'ltangib1li ty and incommunicabil-
ity of these criteria it is exceeding~y difficul t to 
criticize ' them. They are intimately related to super-
stition, magic, religion, and to the optimistic notion 
mentioned earlier that truhh has sorre inherent power 
which enables it ultimately to prevail. Tb.e GreS:k-s were 
not so rash as to banish ~ priori these criteria t 6 a 
sort of intellectual Limbo. There is a continu8us, al-
1. Vid. Brightman, IP, 35-36, 41-42, 46-49. 
7 
though often tenuous, thread of extra-sensory perception 
which reoccurs throughout pre-Socratic speculation and 
appears quite markedly in Plato's theory of I d eas. 
Practicality, or if you wish - pragmatism, is prob-
1 
ably a pre-philosophic criterion of truth. Unsophisti-
ca~ed people today judge on the basis of workabi l ity and 
expedience, and it is not overly bold to assu~e that their 
progenitors also did so in ancient times. And, of course, 
s o-called cownon sense his in al l likelihood been a cri-
terion of truth s ince time immemorial. Philosophers, and 
the pre-Socratics cannot be exonera ted from this fault, 
have often i n the ir soarings lost sig ht of practicality 
and common sens e, of the prosaic yet durable rationality 
o f simply trying to be re a s onable. 
F inally, it might be inferred f r om its attempt in 
its my thologies to account for the diversity of n a tural 
phenomena on the basis of a relatively few d escriptive 
par a me.ters and to r e commend t hese mytholog ies on the basis 
of their scope and i n tellig ibility that the pre-philosophic 
i n t el ligence had so me inklinp; of cohe rence a s a criterion 
2,3,4 
of truth. This idea received considerable, b ut pos-
sibly unconscious, d svelopment in the hands of the e a rlier 
cos mologists who strove to achieve greater coherence than 
l. Vid. Brightman, IP, 50 et ~· 
2. Vid. Bri g htman, IP, 58 et ~· 
3. Vid. Savery, Art. (193 81: 
4. Yid. Ducas se, Art. (1944). 
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the traditional mytholo g ies had a ttained and who evi-
dently re gBrded the c oherence and ec Jnomy of their con-
ce ptual sys t ems to be t heir gre a t es t recommendation. 
Now, equipped wit h this brief survey o f t he pre-
philosophic criteria of tr uth l'lhich were no doubt fam-
iliar to, and to d iffering de grees influenced, the 
philosophers of anci ent Gre e ce, the investigation of 
pre-Socrat ic criteria of truth is r eady to be gin. It 
must be re membered throughout the course of this study 
that the se popular conceptions of truth were forces 
9 
which were continually playing upon the minds of the 
Hellenic philosophers, and that this influence occasion-
ally exceeded the bounds one waullia expect were s pecula-
tion literal l y det~ched. The attack, somet i mes approach-
ing vehmence, on sensation as a criterion of truth, for 
exmmple, must confes s to having been s t r ongly colored by 
an aristocratic conte mpt on the part of a learned mi nor-
ity for the opinions and methods of the rabble. Politi-
cal, social, cultural, and even economic factors contin-
ually i ntruded upon the philosopher's l egendary i vory 
tower, now operating subtlely, the next moment violently. 
It is hoped that this i n troductory discussion will i n so~ 
measure prepare the reader for the never-absent, non-phil-
osophical overtones and unde r currents which will accent 
the subsequent historical account. 
10 
Chapter II 
THE MI LES IAN MONISTS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS 
The fir s t ph i l os op hers, The School of Miletus, 
were emp i ricists. Their chosen occupatio_n was the care-
ful observation and exe gesis of Nature. Tak ing fir s t 
thinp.; s first, they asked bhe question, "What is reali-
1 
ty? 11 The cos mologies whic h they devised to answer 
this query focused on the problem of substance and re-
lied heavily on that data most readily accessible to 
2,3 
them- t he e~td ence of t he senses , Q.ui te 1 i te r ally, 
they looked at Nature more carefully , but at the same 
time with gre a ter i ma g i nation , than anyone had done 
hi therto. 
With more imagination, but also with greater re-
fer 
fl e ction,. 1\ ~ationalism sprang i n to exi s tence simul tan-
eously with empiricism. The Milesian p hilosophers were 
not content merely to observe Nature. They went one 
ste p f urther, and it is t his all important s tep that 
sets phi l os ophy apart from casual observation; t hey 
i ntellectualized about their findin~s. They wei ghed 
a nd organ i zed their experiences with the a i d of their 
men t al f a culties. In short, t hey phile sophized. They 
realized tha t the most valuable truths were not those 
of fact butht hose of prin c i ple. 
1. Burnet, GP, 27-28. 
2. Marita i n, IP, 47. 
3. Russell, HWP, 26 . 
Thales of Miletus 
Little is kn own of Thales of Mi letus, one of the 
1 
Seven Sages of ancient Greece and the fo und er of Ionian 
2 
natural philosophy. It ts not possible, as will be the 
case with subsequent thinkers, to trace schools and in-
fluences, for there were none. Thales was i ndeed the 
father of philosophy. 
Thales said that all is water; water was his first 
3,4 
principle. From where did this hypothesis come? The 
11 
consensus of sc holarly opinion is that the choice of water 
as a first principle was based on e mpirical observation 
5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
of considerable r a n ge. Thales' philos-
ophy was founded f irmly on sensation, seeking its f a ctua l 
data in observation a nd tes t ing its hypotheses with sen-
sation. But t he value which Thales attached to sensory 
data was not wi thout e x ceedin gly s ignificabt reservations, 
for even in his primitive world-view the o pposition b e-
tween sensation a nd reaxon, the opposition which was to 
become the central is s ue of Greek speculation, had alre ady 
13 
become manifest. 
No man lives in a v a c uum. Thales, altho ugh he comes 
closes t to doing so, wa s no e x ce pt ion. Wh ile much of his 
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i mportan ce lie s i n the small d e gree to whic h he relied 
on conventional s ol ution s to t he proble ms he set ~efore 
h i mself, t he r e is s ome evid e n ce that his doctrine that 
1,2,3 
a ll is water may have been traditional. Nevert he-· 
less, while the i n f luence of old mytholog ies may have 
4 
bee n s till stron~ , Tha les was not he avily d e pend ent on 
5 
popular t rad iti on. He made a s erious ef f ort to aban-
don my thical explan a t ion and the criteria of truth whic h 
i t pres upposes, to face the question o f s ub s tance squarely, 
examinin~ it in p hysical rather than mythical t e rms and 
6 ,7,8 . 
seeking real ity behind ph~nomena. He evi~9ed a 
tend ency to substi t ute reason f or imag ina ti on, a "dis-
p o s iti·')n of mind antagoni s tic to t he my tholog ical d is-
9 
position." 
Tha les' eos mo lo p;y was a long , bold s te p forward i n 
t he transition f r om poetry to science, f rom myt hol ogy to 
10,11,12 
philosophy. He had a new common sense W'¥-Y of 
13 14 
look inp; at Na ture; he wished to g ive re a s ons; he re-
cognized i mplicitly, i f not explicitl y, that pgilosophy 
requires unive rsals, points of agreem~nt for all intel-
15 
ligence. By so doing he indicated the wa y to escape 
1. Aristo t le, ~~~., 983b20. 9. Ferrier, PW, II, 42. 
2. Ferrier, Fw, II, 36. 10. Fuller, HGP, I, 85. 
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13 
from the domination of sense-perception as the ulti-
mate criterion of truth, and tha t way was reason, the 
universal faculty, a source of truth that is, unlike 
the transiant, subjective image s of the s enses, abso-
1 
lute and universal. 
Anaximander 
Anaximander, Tgales' friend, compatriot, pupil, 
2,3,4,5,6 
and immediate successor, d eveloped and im-
7 
proved t he system of his master, ably continuing the 
tradition of intense scientific c uriousity established 
8,9 
by the father of philosophy. "He was a man of very 
sane and bold scientific imag inat ion, trying to state 
the most re asonable theory of the orig in and structure 
o f t he world in straightforward terms that would recom-
10 
mendi. it to the enlightened intellects of his time." 
This scientific spirit was based upon an "inno cent 
11 
and unbiased observation of na ture," and, of course, 
implied a great credulity i n the evidence of the senses. 
12 
One o f the most striking features of the d ata thus amas sed 
was the ease with which some semllance of order could be 
imposed on the confusion of p henomena b y sifting pairs of 
1. Ferrier, Fftl' II, 43. 7. Ferrier, PW, II, 49. 2. Adamson, DGP, 7. 8. Fuller, HGP, I, 86 . 
3. Diog . Laert. , LEP, I, 15. 9. Russell, H\~P ' 27. 4. Fairbanks, FPG, 8,11, 13. 10. Cornford, RP , 11. 
5- Snider, AEP, 83. 11. Cornford, RP, 6. 6. Thilly, HP, 17. 12. Scoon, GPBP, 53· 
1,2 
opposites from the chaos. The content ion among op-
posites, the dynamic equilib rium of the un i verse, led 
at once to a hi g her de gree of abstraction, a step fur-
ther removed from immediate sensory e xperience, the con-
3 
cept of re gularity, a necessity, a Natural Law govern-
4 
ing the continual conflict among the opposites - an-
other key ide a in pre-Socratic philosophy. 
But the opposites can not be generated from or 
5 
red uced to one another; they must, therefore, be con-
6 
tained in some One, emers ing from it by se gre gation. 
Correspondingly, this One, t b is primary substance, in-
asmuch as it had to incompass all opposites, could 
7,8,9 
have been any one of t he p hysical elements. 
not 
The 
10 
water of Tha les was too spe cific, rather the One had 
14 
11,12,13 
to be the Boundless, the Non-Lim i ted, the Infinite. 
Anax i mander's doctrine of the Infin ite, this " germ 
14 15 
of idealism," was arrived at log ically, a reco gnition 
of the opposition between the world as given by the trans-
ient app earance s p resented b y the senses and the real 
world apprehended, n ot d irectly, but on the grounds of 
16 
log ical necessity. His thoug ht represents a bo l d step 
forward to a hi g her d egree of abstraction, towards the 
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15 
supersens ible, and away f ro m the sens ualism o f his prede-
1,2 ,3,4 
cesse r. Not only was he the first thinker to a p -
p reciate the significance o f the negative as essential in 
5 
t he consti tut ion of reason, he also wa s t he f irs t to 
postul a t e a s c i e ntific obj e ct, an obj e ct n ot immed i a tely 
perce ived by the sen s es but inferred, thus distinguish-
in g the primary phy s ics fro m its v isib le and protean ele-
6 ,7 
ments. 
Anaximenes 
8 
Ritter p l a ce s Anax i menes be f ore Anax imand e r, but 
in so doing he departs from t he customar y p r a ctice of 
conside r i ng Anaximenes as the pupi l, or at least the as-
9,10,11,12,13,14 
sociate, of Anaxima nder. 
The wa t er of Thales had been to J specific, yet, on 
the other extreme, Anaximander had carried h is abstraction 
too far- the Bo undles s was too v ague a f i r st prin ci_ple. 
Anaximenes tried to mediate bebween these two views by 
taking as his first principle a mate~ial that was one and 
15,16 
i n f i nite, yet de t e r minate _and kn own to experience - air. 
l. Ad a mson , DGP , 15. 
2. Jaeger, P, I, 158. 
3. Sn ider, AEP, 86 . 
4. Thi l l y, HP, 18. 
5. Ferrier, PW, II, 54. 
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It is un just to characterize Anaximenes' system 
as reactionary or "extremely empirical" and wi tt10u:b 
1 
general philosophical foundation. He was a systema-
2 
tizer of previous opinions and a consistent theorist. 
He weeded out the more audacious theories of his pred-
3 
eces s ors and then applied himself to the task of con-
solidating the remaining tenets, o f forg i ng a consis-
t ent body of doctrine from the hypotheses of the earlier 
4 
~·U les ians. His thought is noteworthy for 1 ts logical 
5 
quality of mind; his desire was "to simplify and clar-
6 
ify the con ceptual model of the world;" and his efforts 
illustrate the proposition that "science advances by 
theoretical interpretation as well as by discovering new 
7 
f a cts." 
The Pythagoreans 
The ~l[ilesian Mon ists are said to have been one of 
the more profound influences on the development of Py th-
ago reanism. Pythagoras hims elf, according to some op in-
i (:m, may have be en a pupil of Anaximander and perhaps 
8,9,10 
based his cosmolo gy on that of Anaximenes. But 
Pythagoras and his fol l owers were not perpetrators of 
t he scientific tradition; on the contrary, this le gendary 
l. Ritter, HAP, I, 209. 6. Cornford, RP, 149. 
2. Scoon, GFBP , 28, 255. 7- Scoon, GPBP, 28. 
3. Burne t, EGP, 72. 8. Burnet, EGF, 78-79. 
4. S coon, GPBF , 255-256. 9. Burnet, GP, 39. 
5. S co on, GPBF , 255-256. 10. Fuller, HGP , 1 06 . 
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figure re-int roduced into the philosoppical mainstream 
a tradition most at odds with the spirit o f the new 
science - religious mysticism. 
The re is a least a t ra ce of empiricism in the 
dogma of t he Pythagoreans, and, presumably, Milesian 
influence is responsible. The universe perceive s by 
1 
sensation, and, although the senses are adm i ttedly 
deceptive, intelligence enters from without via their 
mediacy ; thus, because of its need for cognition, the 
soul condescends to dwell a \'Thile in the imperfect 
2,3 
body. 
4 
Alcmaeon of Croton, a pupil of Pythagoras, pur-
sued the se ideas to some ex tent. He di s tinguished sense 
5 
perception fr :.; m understand ing or intelligence, possibly 
basin~ the dic hotomy on the notion that synthesis was 
6 
unique of the latter. He also attributed immortality 
7, 8 
to the reas on alone. 
Still another interpretation of Alcmaeon's tenets 
is that thought is only the stable mode of memory and 
9 
opinion , the basi s of b~ th be i ng transient sensation. 
He combined episte mology wit h psychology and psychology 
10 
with physiology. He he ld that only the gods were cap-
able of real unders t anding, and, consequently, there is 
1. Fairbanks, FPG , 147. 6. Scoon, GPBP, 263, 308. 
2. Fairbanks, FPG , 150 . 7. Adamson, DGP, 144. 
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1,2 
a definite strain of agnosticis m in his tho ught. 
The doctrin e of harmony, a doctrine derived from 
that of opposit~s, evolved further in the hand s of the 
Pythagoreans. They were the first to call the world 
11 order" (cosmos), and they took t h is re~ulari ty to be 
3 
the essence of the universe. Hanmony is necessary, 
and man kn owa by inner revelation, by int uition, that 
the real structure of the world must be an exemplifi-
ca tion of harmony and the embodiment of the div i ne 
4 
proportion that he admires. But the significance 
which the Pythagorean Phi1olaus attached to ha r mony was 
e p istemolo g ical as well as ontolog ical - harmony was in 
5 
some way cognitive, akin to the Jious of Anaxago r as, al-
6 
most God. I t es t ablished thro ugh numerical specifica-
tion a correspond ence between knowleoge and b e ing , ex-
isting b~ th in cogn ition and in Nature, 11 ••• a union of 
t h ings mi xed from many parts, and an a g ree ment of var-
7 
iously mind ~d beings." 
The Pythagoreans we re relig ious mystics, and their 
do gma serves t<h und erscore ce rtain criteria o f truth con -
18 
c omitnsnt with such a posi t ion. Py t hagoras hims elf, le gend 
8 
baa it, was d ivine ly i ns pired and practiced d i vination. 
He also was supposed to have retain ed t he r e comiliection of 
----~~ ---- ----~ 
1. Freeman, APSP, 40. 5· Vid. Chapter v. 
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1,2,3 
previous e xistences. The criterion of truth as-
sociated with such a doctrine of mete mpsychosis is, of 
4,5 
course, the doctrine o f reminiscence of Plat )nic f a me. 
Pythagoras' disciples accepted authority as a 
criterion of truth, i nvesting g r eat faith i n the teach-
6 
ing s of "ingenious persons. 11 The y also practiced ~ 
communal contemplation during wh i ch they were supposed 
to be divinely inspired b y the spirit of the ma s ter, 
7,8 
Pythagoras. 
The most i n t e resting of the Pythagorean doctrines 
is that of Numbers. They taug ht that all of Nature was 
9,10,11,12 
composed of numbe rs, holding that numbers were 
the essence or first pr inciple o f .al l things a nd that de-
. 1?,14,15,16 
finitions were connected with n umbers. They 
gave n umbers a very real existence and spoke o f t hem as 
17 
the causes of all that happens. 
The p re mise that all things are numbers is to be 
18,19 
understood quite literally, not abstractly; numbers 
20 
are inseparable fr om the objects of sense. Later Pyth-
a goreans modified and weakened this view, possibl y due to 
19 
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the criticisms of Zeno of Elea, s~ying that things were 
not actually numbers but only .J:ik~ them, that t h ings exist 
1,2 
by imitating numbers. 
Pythagoras is often g iven credit as the founder of 
3 
geometry; "mathematics, i n the sense of demonstrative de-
4 
ductive argument, b e g ins with him." Now 11 mathematics is 
.•. the chief source of the belief in eternal and exact 
5 
trub.h, as well as in a super-sensible world." Thus the 
Pythagoreans, by supposing existing things to be composed 
of mathematical units, eliminated sensually-perceived cor-
poreal mat t er retaining the i n tellectually-perceived form 
6 
alone as true, presupposing bv such a libe r ation from the 
world of tang ible matter realities of a higher order than 
7,8 
those perceptible to the sensory equipment. 
The Pybhagoreans applied t hemselves to mathematical 
studi e s to purge the ir souls of opinion and other vulgar 
9 
criteria of truth and sought thereby a world-view as cer-
20 
tain and as exact as the theorems of geometry, not dependent 
on empirical knowledge with its many shortcomings, but based, 
as they presummed mathemat ics to be based, solely on thought, 
a faculty supe r ior to sense or intuition, a basis for unive r-
10,11,12 
sal truth, truth va l id for al l intellect. 
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II Ev e rything that can be known has a number," 
according to Philolaus, 11 for it is impossible to g ra s p 
21 
1 
anythinp; with the mind or to recognize it without this." 
Numbers and the rela t i ons a mong them, namely harmony, 
were the conditions of as well as the proper objects of 
knowledge; the recognition by the soul of their opera-
2,3 
tion constituted truth. Number is, in fact, the 
cause of reco gnition, able to g ive guida nce and 
teaching to every man in what is puzzling and 
unknown .•• Number, fitting all things into the 
soul throug h sense-perception, makes them re-
cogni zable and comparable with one another ... 
n wnber ... divides the different relationships 
of things ..• The nature of Number and Harmony 
ad mits of n o false hood. 11 4 
P hilosophy has been launchad and already it finds 
its elf in hi g h seas. Four opposed traditions; science 
and m~sticism, emp iricism and rationalism; have already 
a ppeared, and their influence has bee n firmly entren ched 
in pre-Socratic tho ught. In their doctrine of Number 
the Pythagore~ns hav.e establis hed a p recedent of dis-
satisfacti J n with the s ensory f aculties, and this mal-
content will func t ion healthily as a goad which a gain 
and again will press speculation to i n creasingly exal t ed 
- e gress of abstracti on, clo s er and clos er to a mo re i d eal 
r a ti ona l ism- ~nt il Elea t icism's ill-fated Icarian flight. 
1. Freeman, APSP, 74. 
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Chapter III 
XF.NOPHANES A ~ID HERACLITUS 
The time is at hand for a distinction to be mad e 
22 
betwe en three freque ntly con fused philosophical positio~ s. 
By s kept icism is me a nt, in the most exa ct sense of the 
t erm, the views de r ive d from the assertion that the r e is 
n o trut h . By a gnosticism is meant t 'ne views derived fro m 
the assertion t hat man is i gnoran t of the truth or is ig~ 
norant as to whether there is truth or not. But the term 
s k e pt icism, apparently for the want of a bet t er name, is 
frequently used to describe another and very different 
philosophical attitude - an a ttitude so common amon~ thg 
0 
pre~~dratics that it nearly as bumes the proportions of 
be ,i:gg one of their d ist inguis bing bharacteris tics. This 
second sense of skepticism allud es to the perennial and 
preci o us dissatisfaction which rankles i n the philosopher's 
bos om; it is t he goad, or the lure, which inspires men to 
venture upon the philosophical quest. It leads t he phil-
osopher, as in the c a se of Xenophanes, to quest ion the ac-
complis ~ments of man, or, even more profoundly , as in the 
c a se of Heraclitus, to ques tion the ab ility of man to 
know truth. 
Xenophanes of Colophon 
Xeno p hanes of Colophon, the first of the Eleatics, 
s eems to have been a wand ering poet and speculative theo-
1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
lo~ ian rathe r than a philoso p her proper. 
8,9,10 
Possibly he was a pu p il of Anaxi mander, and there 
23 
are ale"ments in his work which strongly intima te Pythago-
11 
raan influences. 
Xenophanes was dismayed by the moral harm caus ed 
by the mythical tradit~ons of the poets and responded 
in three ways which were all de s t i ned to play important 
12,13 
roles thro ughout the history of hellenic thoug ht. 
Firstly, t here was the ne gative response, an ~ conoclasm, 
a scornful rejection of t he old gods and the ant hropo-
morphism they e mbodied (by anthropomorphism is meant 
both anthropomorphism proper, g iving human forms tlo ~sgods, 
and ant hropopathism, g i ving human emoti ons and motives to 
gods (and Nature)). In the second place, there was the 
positive atte mpt to crystallize conceptions of new divin-
14 
ities which would not be an aff~ont to human inte llig ence. 
And finally, fro m the deep impression he felt o f the power 
of art and it s ability to make t he false seem true and the 
true fal s e, good evil and evil good, there was b orn that 
15,16,17 
suspicion of art which was to infe ct no less tha n Plato. 
1. Burnet, EGP, 127. 
2. Fairbanks, FPG, 65. 
3. Jae ger, P, I, 169. 
4. Maritain, IP, 60-61. 
5. Plato, So :e_h., 242D. 
6. Scoon, GFBP, 46. 
7. •r hilly, HP, 26-27. 
8 . Burnet, EGP, 114. 
9. Burnet, GP, 33. 
10. Turner, HP, 45. 
11. Jaeger, P, I, 169-171. 
12. Freeman, APSP, 22. 
13. C:t> Plato, Re£., 377 e_t_ se_q. 
14. Scoon, EGP, 47. 
15. Jae ger, P, I, 170, 174. 
16. Jaeger, P, II, 213 et ~e_q. 
17. Viq.Flato, B~£., 277 et seq. 
All t hree of these responses are re l ated to the problem 
of truth: the first rejects all those criteria of truth 
inherent in my s tagogic religion- authority, intuiti on , 
divine r evelation; the second involves the formation of 
a new t heology not i ncon s istent with criteria of truth 
which the reason previously holds to be valid; and the 
th i rd pl unges into the heart o f the very profound prob-
l em of art, truth, and artistic truth. 
Tha les tried to sever p hilosophy from its de pen-
den ce on ancient mystical religions. This atte mpt to 
s ubstitute scientific obs ervation and rational cri t eria 
of truth for the old do gmas and po e tic t radit i on and 
their crite r ia represented the genesis of philosophy. 
The iconoclasm of Xenophanes is significant i n the his -
t or y of th i s r elig ious criticism f or it indicat es that 
a heal thy doubt had s pread from the Ion ian physicists 
with whom it had orig i nated t o those like Xenophanes whom 
were not professional philosophers. With Xe no phanes the 
prablem of truth became the con cern of every well-educat-
ed man and not the spe G!d!al pr e cin c t of metaphysic l.ans -
1 
"philos ophy was becomi ng a cul t ural f orce." 
Xenophanes' iconoclasm had a b voad a spect. It was 
24 
a n inte gral part of an i mpressive program of social r e form. 
He wanted to cast d own the pr evail ing i deals of cult ure and 
the criteria of truth o f the market place and the s_anct.UII! 
- -- - - - - - -- - - - - - · --i 
1. J ae ger, P , I, 169. 
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sanctorum and to put in their place a natural and log i- ~ 
- l 
cal conception of t he universe. He felt that 11 the tales 
of the poets [were] directly responsible for the moral 
2 
corruption of the time." But more important, inasmuch 
a s he associated god with the \•rorld-order and thus, it 
must be supposed, with ultimate truth, he realized that 
god, like truth, must be eternal and immutable and not 
dependent u pon on circumscribed by the whims and follies 
of human kind. 
Those who cast d own old. gods make for themselve s 
the task of setting up new. Co nsequently Xenophanes 
f ound himself faced vri th the problem of arriving 11 at a 
3 
knowledge of God, who is truth." He was not able to 
free himself from the hylozoism and anthropomorphism to 
4,5,6 
whic h he objected, ye t he did manage to e nvisag e a 
diety vastly superior to those of the popular reli~ions 
o f his day and to i n troduce i n to the olog ical thought the 
7 
monis t ic doctrines of the Ionian physicists. 
8 ,9 
He he 1d that God is the One a nd the All. The 
monotheistic n ature of Xenophanes ('d~.la ty indicates a s i ngle 
s et of governing principle s, and its panthe istic chttrac-
ter indica~es that this set of principles is a pplicable 
to a ll of Nature. He se e ms t o have a nt icipated the Nous 
l. Jae ge r, P, I, 170. 
2. Bur net, GP, 35. 
5. Thilly, HP, 27. 
6 . Turner, HP, 45-46. 
3. Ri tter, HAP, 443. 
4. Fuller, HGP, 101. 
7. Of. Freeman, AFSP, 23. 
8. Aristotle, IvTe_t.., 9 86b25. 
9. Thilly, HP, 27. 
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of Anaxagoras (frag. 21.25) and t o have left the d oor ajar 
f or man to acquire so me knowled~e o f the nature o f this 
set ·of prin ciples, for perhaps the d ivin e mind f unctions 
in a ma n ner similar ~o t he work i ng s of man's mi nd a nd is 
th-t:t 'efore accessibl e to human intellige n ce. He als o say s 
(frag . 21.26) that once we have perceived the s e pr i n cip les 
we have knowled ge, not merely for the non ce, not fleeting 
illumination, but f or all t i me; immutable, etern al k n ow-
1 
led g e - t hat is to say, truth. Xeno p hanes, to summarize, 
atte mpted to re pa ir the breach between theolo gy and phys ics; 
he de scribed the compass (All) and t he nature (One and i m-
mu t able) o f the realm o f truth. 
The Ske ptic s poin t ed to Xen ophanes as their e a rliest 
2,3 
forerun~er. Now the accusation ~f ske pticism , when one 
is co n cerned wit h the proble m of truth and · its criteria, 
is always a very serious one indeed, for if a p hilosopher 
insists that t he re is no truth t here is little point in 
sea rching thro u g h his work for criteria of truuh. Certain-
ly some of the fragme n ts of Xenop hanes utterance s g ive 
4 
cause for the suspicion of skepticism. Some au t hors hold 
that Xen ophanes was a complete s,keptic; t hat he denied the 
possib ility o f absolute and objective knowledge and dis-
5,6,7,8 
missed r e ason alon~ with sensation as d eception. 
l. Cf. Jae ger, P, I, 172, 294. 
2. Patrick, GS , 8. 
3. Fairbanks, FPG , 84. 
4. F re ema n , APSP, 22, 24. 
5. Fa irbanks, FPG, 84-85. 
6. Ferrier, PW, II, 81. 
7. Freeman, PSP, 97. 
8. Ritter, HAP , 443. 
Another aut hor restricts Xenophanes' skepticism to 
1 
matters of theology, while yet another, pointing 
to the compelling evidence that Xenophanes had v e ry 
positive theories of his own, adheres to the more con-
servative point of view that he was not a complete 
2 
s ke p t ic. 
~ enophanes was skeptical, yet not a s k eptic. 
He occup ies a strateg ic position in the history of the 
problem of truth. While the Milesians and the Pythago-
reans may have been the f irst to become dimly aware of 
super-sensory truth, Xenophanes recogni zed t he dif f i-
culties involve d in sensa t ion with hitherto unequalled 
clearness; he appreached a realiz~tion o f the conce p t 
27 
o f double consciousnes s more c l osely than his predeces-
sors, discern ing on the one hand the rati onal c o nsci ous-
ness of the cognizant, immutable One, real and true in 
itself; and on the other hand the sensible consciousness 
which has as its Jbject the changeable , the un r eal, the 
Ilfany. He pioneered the d i stin ction betwEJen true knowle d g e 
3,4 
and opinion, the knowled ge of appearance s; between the 
universal or One and the particular or Many. In s hort, 
5,6,7 
he introduced the problem of truth into Greek thought. 
1. Russell, WNP, 40. 5. 
2. Patrick, GS, 9. 6. 
3. Adamson, DGP, 31. 7. 
4. Ritter, B~P, 435, 441. 
Ferrier, Yw, I I , 88. 
Fuller, HGP, 1 01. 
Scoon, GPBP, 306. 
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This dawning awareness of the momentous difficul-
ties involved in t he problem of truth left Xenophanes 
in a state of d azed sho ck. Yet, while cautio usly treat -
ing all philosophical systems a s conjecture and the 
1 
~uesses of private persons, he nevertheless d id not lose 
2 
f a ith in the ex i s tence of an absolute truth, and he con-
3 ,4 
t *iued t o aim, even if blindly, at ce rta inty and truth, 
Man is incapable of absolute certitude, and opini on is the 
lot of all, for even were man to happen upon the truth he 
5 
would not kn~w wha t he had achieved. Truth may, however, 
be a p proximated by opinion, not throu~h divine r evelation, 
6,7,8,9 
but by pat ient study. By such diligent i nvestiga-
tion one may ga i n a better and better opin ion which will 
10 
beco me i n creasingl y more like the truth. Truth is to 
11 
be d i scovered by de grees. 
The ke y to Xenop hanes' e p istemologi cal t r oubles lies 
i n his as sertion that man cannot recognize truth e ven when 
he has it within his grasp; Xenophanes had no i nstrument 
12 
for jud g in~ knowledge; he ha d no criterion of t r u t h. 
13 
The conc l usions of Zeller form so sensible and summary an 
acco unt of Xenophanes' theories that they deserve to be 
quoted at length: 
1. Fuller, HGP, 101. 
2reeF~a~mi~~, PSJ, 98. 
3. Ferrier, P1tl , II, 81. 
4. Turne r, HP, 46. 
5. Freeman, APSF, 24. 
6. Freeman, APSP, 24. 
7. Freeman, PSP, 98. 
8. Fuller, HGP , 101. 
9. Robin, GT, 81. 
10. Scoon, GPBP, 3 06 . 
11. Turner, HP , 46. 
12. Freeman, PSP , 97-98. 
13. Zeller, HGP, I, 574-576. 
It would be more i mportant, were the a ssertion 
~:Javrect, that Xenophanes either wholly d enied 
the possibil ity of kn owledge , or restricted it 
29 
to the doctrine of the De ity; or, as o the rs say, 
that he reco gnized the truth o f the pe rce ption s 
of reas on on ly, and not the pe rce p tions o f sense. 
The e xpressi ons, however, f ro m which the state-
ment is derived ha ve by no me ans this scope and 
co mpass . Xenophanes obs erves that :t:ruth i s only 
discovered by d e grees. · He thinks tha t perf ect 
certa i n ty of kno wled ge is n ot poss i ble; i f ever 
a man s hould hit upon the t r u th i n a ma t t e r, he 
i s never absolute ly certain tha t he has done so ; 
a nd , therefore, Xe n ophanes design a tes h i s own 
vi ews , even on the we ightiest questions, mere l y 
as p robabilities. Bu t thi s modesty of the p hil-
osophe r oug ht not to be mistaken for a ske pt ical 
t he o r y, tho ugh it a ro s e, no d o ubt, fr om a ske p ti-
cal temperament. For the uncertain ty of :nowledge 
i s no t he re bas ed on a general inqu i ry into t he 
i n telle ctual f a culty of man , it is s i mply maintain-
ed a s · he res ~lt o f p ers ona l experience; c onse-
quently, the ph ilosop he r i s no t hind ered, by the 
consideration of it, fro m advancing his t heo lo g i-
cal and phys ical propositions with full ·co nviction. 
Hera clttus of Ephesus 
Some have asserted that Heracli tus was a d iscip l e 
of Xenophanes, yet there is little eviden ce to s upport 
l 
s u ch an opin ion. However, Heraclitus was acquaanted 
with the r.C iles ian cos molog ists and with the poems of 
Xeno p hanes, and he also se ems t o have had some familiari-
2,3 
t y with the the ories of Pythagoras. 
He raclitus haa a muc h more p rofound i n flue nce upon 
4 
his succes s ors than any other of the early physicists. 
l. Burnat, EGP, 131. 
2. Bu r net, EGP, 131. 
3. c:u:. Freeman, APSP , 33. 
4. V.Jeber and Perry, HP, 1 8 . 
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He was the f irst seriously to atte mpt a dichotomy between 
the qualit ies d irectly sensed and those inferred by reas on, 
an<i it was I.Yit h the reco gnitio .:J of t his problem that Greek 
philosophy began to emerge f rom a blissful sta te of inno-
2,3 
1 
cen ce. This new awakening was destined to grow, to fore-
shadow the critical question, and to evolve dire ctly , down 
a dynasty of Heraclitean thinkers, to the s ~ eptic i sm of 
Cratylus- and to become the heritage of Cratylus' youthful 
pupi l, Plato, I.Y ho also was to doubl. t the ve racity o f the 
senses and the possibility of knowiliedge, who was to escape 
from the Heracli tean Flux by takL1g refuge i n an immutable 
4,5,6 
world o f I deas. The genesis o f the critical philoso-
phy of the Sophists, of the Socratic do ctr i ne of the con -
cept and the Platonic doctrine of the Idea, was to be found, 
as we l l as the seed o f the most extreme forms o f s kepticism, 
7 
in the Heracl itean philosophy. 
The cosmo log i es and episte mol og ie s of the pre- Hera-
eli tean p hiloso phers were frequently :Jound to gether i n a 
most tenuo us and arbitrary fashion, if at all. The episte-
mology of He raclitus, however, ';laS i ntima tely associated 
with his cosmology, which, i n turn, was built upon three 
fundamental concepts: (1) that of opposites, (2) that of 
flux, and (3) t hat of the Law. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Scoon, GPBP, 53. 
Turner, HP, 57-58. 
Weber and Perr y, HP, 20. 
Patrick, GS, 10-11, 232 et 
5· ,... 
0. 
_§_eg. 7. 
Webb. HP, 16~17, 25. 
i.veber and Fe rry, HP, 
20, 39, 53, 57-
Turner, HP , 57-58. 
Heraclitus, when he ado pts the Pythagorean doc-
trine of oppos i tes, gives it two si~nificant metaphys-
i 8al twists - he identifies opposites, but as a phys-
1,2,3,4 
ical, not a lo g ical, theory, and he makes the 
cease l e s s strife a mong opposi t es ths father and king 
5,6 
of all tnings, the dynamic principle of his co smos. 
7 
In the former connection Burnet makes the valuab le 
observati~n that Heraclitus' identification of oppo-
sites if logically pursued leads to a type of relati-
vistic theory which anticipates Protagoras, alt hou g h 
Heracl i tus himself did not subscribe no s uch relativism 
becaus e he believed that all things, even the opposites, 
8 
were r e conciled in God, the "one wise." 
The opposite s , t hus, are not f ixed points of re-
f~ re n ce f or t heir extreme c ha ra c t e r invites the i n t ru-
31 
9 
sion of compe n sa t ing qualities. There is no pe rman e n cy; 
10,11,12,13,14 
s t a ys; all t h i ng s change; all is flux. n othing 
15 
Nor, as Plato t hought, 15are merely s uch things as are 
sanso rily a pprehend ed ca ught up i n the He racl Ltean flux . 
As a ma t t e r o f f a ct, it is thro ugh the senses tha t some 
16 
t hing s seem de c eptively pe r manent. There is n othing 
- - ·- - - - - ---
1. Aristotle, Met., l005b24. 
2. Aristotle, ~hy~ ., l 85bl9. 
3. Burnet, EGP, 144, 167-167. 
4. Tur ner, HP , 56. 
5. Thilly, HP, 24. 
6. Vfindel band, HAi, 50 • . 
7. Burnet, EGP , 1 66-167. 
8 . Qf. Freeman, APS P , 29. 
9. Freeman, APSP, 33. 
10 • .Arist8tle, p e_ Ca~lq_, 
298b30. 
11. Aristotle, ~O£ ., 104b22. 
12. Ferrier, PN , II, 113. 
13. Plato, Thea§_t., 160D. 
14. Ze ller, HGP, II, 1 1 -20. 
15. Webb, HP, 17. 
16. Turner, HP, 54. 
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(w i t h the e x cept ion o f the Law) fi xed and abiding , only 
1,2,3,4 
fl uxional process. There i s n o Being , only Becoming . 
Now this i s a d e plorable situation. If nature, as 
Heraclitus a sserts, is in a sta t e o f continual c ha nge, 
the n any state ment con cerning it will be o utdate d , no 
longer true, even before it ha s is s ued from the observers' 
lips. All knowled ge is 13: prior!_ ob s olete . And what ha s 
become of truth, immutable truth, the same fo r every on e 
everywhere a nd for all time? Ep iste mology finds it s elf 
i mpaled on the f irs t horn of t ha t d 4l lemma which the S o-
ph ists we r e l a ter to d e l i ght i n exploiting (t he o ther 
horn - the Ele a tic doctrine tha t all is Being , thtt there 
is no Becoming , n o change, and that knowledge, i gnorance 
becomi n g wisdom, is there f ore i mpossible).How will e p iste-
mology e xtrica te itself? 
How strange it would be had this austere pers on, 
who i n p ublic life was devoted to the ca use of law a nd 
5 
o r d.er, al l owed anarc~~ to domi nate his cosmos. Heracli-
tus pointed a way out f rom the problem he had posited. 
6 
He "passionately held" to a pe r s onal co nviction of the 
reality of value aad t ruth, and he immediately set hi~­
se l f t o the tas k o f rescuing knoweld ge fro m the danger 
t 
i n which ~e d octrine of flux had placed it. He held t ha t 
1. Ferrier, Fw , II, 122. 4. Freeman, APSP , 31. 
2. Turner, HP, 54. 5. Windelband, HAP, 683. 
3. Freeman, APSP, 25. 6. Maritain, IP, 51-52. 
while all is in a state of constant flux, yet the cosmic 
process is not haphazard but rather that change occurs in 
1,2 
accordance with "measure." In this manner a universal 
order is restored. A rational prinm~wilie is evoked as an 
immutable Grlindl~gg whose strictures provide a framework 
within wh i ch the transient world of appearances is con-
fined. The details of the cosmos are ever-shifting , pro-
t 
33 
tean; but \be pat t ern of events is fixed; the modes of change 
3 
are g iven by de st ,iny, order, and the reason o f the IAJOrld. 
The unive rse is generated, not in accordance with time, but 
with something whose valid ity is independ ent of flux, Be-
co ning, and time, wit~ reason and intelli~ence, with neces-
4,C1,6,7 
sity, with Law. vfith this conception of the 1;oe;~13 
8 
or universal law Heraclmtus s ketched that of natural law. 
He reco gnized more &learly than did his predecessors the 
9 
need of a r~tional principle to direct the universe. 
Heraclitus repeatedly stresses the point that the law 
10 
is COill:!,On to all. He appeals to his listeners, not on t he 
basis of superior wisdom or some other authority, but t e lls 
11,12 
th.em to hea rken t that which is common to all, the Law. 
In the fact that the Law is common to all lies its cogency. 
l. Burnet, EGP, 150. 
2. Thilly, HP, 25. 
3. 1rlindelband, HAP, 36-37. 
4. Fairbanks, FPG , 62. 
5. Fuller, HGP, 130. 
6. Ritter, HAP, I, 245. 
7. Zeller, HGP, I, 190. 
6. Windelband, HAP, 54. 
9. Thilly, HP, 15. 
10. Freeman, AFSP, 24-26. 
11. Benn, GP, 18. 
12. Zeller, HGP, II, 88. 
13. Freeman, APSP, 28. 
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The· Law provides a common ground in the mi dst of flux 
1 
which enables human intellects to communicate. Through 
the Law man may rise above the level of inarticulate ir-
rationality. The Law respond's to man's desire to know; 
it justifies his claim to knowledge, and througn· it tne 
2 
universe and man's rationality become counterpaTts. · It 
3 
is at once tne condition and the object of knowledge. 
Heraclitus was given to oracular utterances which 
4 
ne made no attempt to prove. \'lhence arose his assurance? 
Russell has suggested that Heraclitus t'wa.s a. mystic, but 
5 
or a peculiar kind." The famed Delphic maxim was 11 K.'10W 
thyself," and to tne rea.liza. tion· o·f this very end Hera-
clitus took as his methodological credo the maxim, "I 
6,7 
searched into myself." Heraclitus sought truth by in~ 
trospection• Man is a part of the cosmos, a.no as such he 
too must embody the universal Law. Thus the wise man di-
recta his attention inward to the human soul, tbe micro-
cosmos, and by such insight penetrates beneath the surface 
8,9 
of sensory appearances to the hidden truth. Self-con-
sciousness and understanding were the cardinal v i rtues or 
10,11 
Heraclitus. Intuition was his immediate goal. 
1. Freeman, APSP, 32. 7. Freeman, AFSP, 31. 
2. Fuller, HGP, 30. 8. Jaeger, P, I, 179-183. 
3. Ritter, HAP, I, 234. 
4. Th1lly, HP, 23. 
9. Scoon, GPBP, 52. 
10. Windelband, HAP, 59. 
5. Russell, HWP, 41. 
6. Burnet, GP, 59. 
11. Sc oon, GPBP, 60-61, 287. 
But vrhat is this intui tion, and how is such an en-
lig htened sta te produced? Firstly, it can be said that 
l 
intuition is trained by exper1ence,frag. 22.35). Yet 
2 
e xperience alone is insufficient (frag. 22.45). The 
initiative of man' s f a culties is not enough; there must 
be a more intimat e r e lationship between man a nd the cos-
3 
mo s in which he find s h imself. rlfisd om be g ins with ex-
4,5,6,7,8 
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pe r ie n ce, wit h sensation; but the senses are un-
t rustworthy and i nadequa te witnesses ~or they g ive the 
9 ,10,11 
f ictitious impression of fixity t o some things 
while havin 0 a s t heir obj e cts isola ted and fl eet ing p \"len-
12,13,14,15 
'J me na. Furt hermore, sensation is a particular 
f a culty o f me n peculiar to differe nt k i nd s of i ntellig e nce. 
16 
While man may l e arn t he qualities o f thing s from sen sory ob-
17 
servations, sen sation witho u t reflecti ~n is of relative l y 
18' 19 
little v alue. A universal faculty co mmon to all i n -
20 
tellig ence must be evok e d. Such a faculty is reason, 
and with reason man can discern the Law buried wi t hin the 
21,22,23,24,25 
see mi ngl y c haotic flux. Heraclitus, unfort-
1. Freeman, APSP, 27. 
2. F ree man, AFSP, 27. 
3. Ritter, HAP, I, 250. 
4. Adamson, DGP, 43-44. 
5. Freeman, APSP, 28. 
6. Freeman, PSP, 118. 
7. Scoon, GFBP, 307. 
8. vve ber a nd Perr;r, HP, 20. 
9. Adams on, DGP, 47. 
10. S coon, GPBP, 54. 
11. Turner, HP, 57. 
12. Free man, PSP, 118, 124. 
13. Full er, HGP, 136-137· 
14. Weber and Perry, HP, 20. 
15. Zeller, HGP, II, 28-89. 
16. F errier, PW, II, 137. 
17. Zeller, HGP, II, 89-90. 
18. Thilly, HP, 25. 
19. Weber a nd Perry, HP, 20. 
20. Ferrier, PW, II, 137. 
21. Benn, GP, 18. 
22. Freeman, PSP, 118. 
23. Full er, HGP, 136-137. 
24. Ueberwe g , HP, I, 42. 
25. Webe r and Perry, HP, 20. 
unately, d id not go bey ond this point: Socrates was the 
first to uno ertake the task o f determi n i n g the cmditions 
1 
of rational kn owledge. 
Doubt was born '"'ith philo s ophy, and by the times of 
Xeno phanes and Heraclitus the tradition of s ystemat ic 
doubt had made itself man ifest. There was, on the one 
hand, an i mpatience with tradition and a contempt of pop-
ular o p inion, and, on t he o ther, a profound current of 
dis comfort over the inadequac~ of man's sensory faculties. 
It was s oon r e cogn ized that the senses we r e not completely 
re l iable, and efforts were made to s tilistitute reason to 
repair the deficiencies o f the san ses. Yet e ; istemology 
was st i ll in swaddling clothes ana reason was hesitant 
ab ~ut assumi ng c o~mand. The period of thoug ht g raced by 
the figures of Xenophanes and Heraclitus was a rich form-
ative period, yet a period of transition. Consequent l y 
the ir solutions to the p roblem of truth and its criteria 
were rat he r atyp ical of pre-Socratic s p ecul a ti on as a 
whole and partial. 
1. Turner, HP, 57. 
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Chapter IV 
THE ELEATICS 
Sensation as a crite ~ion of truth was acknowledged 
as inadequate at best, deceptive at worst; yet an under-
stand i ng of reason~ and of the details of its application 
had not been sufficiently developed to enable this cri-
te r ion of truth to step in and fill the lacuna created 
by the decline of sensation's reputation. This wa s the 
t a sk of the Elea vics, of Farmenddes in particular. The 
pre-Parmenidean philos ophers toyed with the idea of a-
bandon in~ sensa tion, but they had to content themselves 
with a "reason" tha t wa s little more than analog ical gen-
1 
e r alization. Parmen ides, however, made the bold plunge. 
He c a te 3orically dismissed all s ensation as sheer, even 
if sometimes u s eful, opinion and unequivocally proclaimed 
r eas on or log ic to be his sole crite r ion of t r uth. 
Parmenides of Elea 
Parme n ides of Elea, " a man to b e 
2 
reverenced and at 
the same t ime fe a red," 
3,4,5,6 
of Xenophanes, 
is alleged to have been the pu p il 
7,8 
yet was "no follower of his," 
for, althoug h he enlarged tha t philoso p he r's distinction 
9,10 
between sensory and rationa l cogni t i on, the Pythag-
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
5. 
S coon, GPBP, 71. 
Plato, The aet., 183E. 
Ad a mson·,- DGP-: 30, 32. 
Fa i r banks, FPG, 86, 106. 
Snide r , AEP, 100. 
6 . 
7-
8. 
9. 
10. 
Turner, HP, 47. 
Diog. Le.ert., LEF, II, 
Fa irbanks, FPG, 1 06. 
Ritter, HAF , I, 4 4 8. 
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ore a ns 1t1ere the d ominate, if ne ga t ive, influence u pon 
1,2,3,4,5, 6 ,7 
him. Furthermore, he was a c quainted with 
8 
the teac hi n gs of Heracl i t us and his cosmology bears 
9,10 
38 
t he faint stamp of Anaximander, despite his r e jection 
ll 
of the Milesian con c ept of c hange. 
Pa r me n ides' famous d id a c t ic poem, .Q!! Na.t._ l;! .(~ , \'las d i-
vided i n to a . Pr ologue and t wo par ts: The W~y Qf _!~~~~ and 
12 
'rhe YJ~Y of_Q;Q inio_:q. I' he burden of the work as a whole 
is a n a lle go r ical description of how Pa rmenides himself 
was led by a goddess from e rror (night), presumably Pyth-
13 
agoreanism, to t ruth (day). Two metholog ical paths a r e 
fi g ura tively repres ented: tha t of truth, attained throu~h 
re as on and the prope r subject of a MET PHYSICS o r science 
of a b s olute knowled~e; and that of opinion, the product of 
sensory p e r ception and the proper ma terial for a hypotheti-
14,15 
c a l PHYSICS o r cosmo logy of a ppe a rances. 
The goddess be g ins her lesson by pointing out most 
e mphat ic a lly thaB the re is only ONE path available to those 
16 
who seek t r uth (frags. 28.2 and 7). Herein lies the crux 
of Pa rmenides' p hilosophy. The compuls i on of pure r e a son 
is the g r e a t dis covery about which hi s p hilosop hy is cen-
17 
te r ed. J. Re a s on ha s an absolute compelling c og en cy, for 
1. Burnet, EGP, 170-171. 
2. Burnet, GP, 64. 
3 • Corn ford , PP , 2 8 . 
4. Fairbanks, FPG, 86. 
5. Rus s ell, 1-iVlF , 48. 
6. Snider, )\ EP, 99-100 . 
7. Thi lly, HP, 28. 
8. Thilly, HP, 28. 
9. Adamson, DGP , 33. 
10. Jae ger, P, I, 175. 
11. Scoon, GPBP, 68. 
12. Fer~ier, ~1 , II, 91. 
13. Burnet, GP , 65-66. 
14. Cocker, CGP, 307-308. 
15. Turner, HP, 47. 
16. Freeman, : psp, 42, 43. 
17. Jae ger, P, I, 175. 
non-b eing is inconceivable and ca~not even be s poken of 
1,2 
or mention ed; to do so is unre a sonable. Reason is a 
3 
tyrant t ha t commands and debars (frags. 28.6 and 7). 
The ~oddess tells him to jud~e by reasonin~ and not to 
4 
trus t his senses, for re a son is our s p iritual eyes a nd 
ears, and the man who fails to use his reason is worse 
than one blind and deaf, bein~ lost in the maze of con -
trad i ctions a nd in the multiplicity of the Hera clitean 
C) 
flux. All, mankind and Nature as well, must bow be f ore 
the uncontested he g e mo ny of reason. Reason's behest must 
be obeyed. no matte r what the consequences may be, even if 
it requires the philosopher to turn his b ack on the 11 ob-
6 
vious facts 11 of immedia te e xperience. 
The energy with which Parmenides 11 imposes his doc-
trines on his audience arises not from the enthusia sm of 
the doctrina ire but from the lo g ician's triumpha nt belief 
7 
in the necessa ry sequence of his thoughts. 11 By virtue of 
8 
this 11 force of. truth11 reason becomes a cosm ic agent, and 
39 
yields tnuth which, unlike the rela£ive truth of sensation, 
9 
must be ad mitted by all intellig ence. 
Whence t his extre me certitude? Thoug ht and Being, 
10,11,12 
Parmenides held, are identica l. Nothing unthinkab le, 
1. C f . Pla to , !:a rm. , 163C . 
2. Cf. Plato, SoQ~., 238C. 
3· Freeman, APSP, 43. 
4. Cornford, PP, 45. 
5. Jae ger, P, I, 176 . 
6. S co on, GPBP, 74. 
7. Jaeger, P, I, 175. 
8. Scoon, GPBP, 74-75. 
9. Ferrie r , Pltl, II, 100. 
10. Scoon, GPBP, 67. 
11. Thilly, HP, 28. 
12. Ueberweg, HP, 54. 
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1,2 
nothin~ contrad ictory to thought, could be reai; thoug ht 
3 
apprehends Being only. Tha t which can be thought and that 
which can be are one and the same, and whatever is an ob-
4 ,5,6,7 
ject of thought is also an object of existence. 
Thought recogn ized thebeing of that-which-is as necessary 
8 
and the existence of that-which-is-not as impos s ible. 
9 
Truth consists in t he knowledge of the se principles, and 
10,11 
such t r uth must be universal truth for al l r eas on. 
Farme n ides was the first p hilosophe r to argue, to 
deduce fo rmally conclusions from premises rather than to 
12 
be con t ent with do~mat ic pronounc ements. He was the 
first to abstract and formul a te the prin c i ple of identi-
ty and tha t of non-contradiction as the fundamental axioms 
13 
of all thought. Here is something new. He r e is a con-
i4 
ception of the me anin~ o f a log ical proof. Truth re s ts 
upon proof, and reason is the "way" by which propositions 
15 
may be proved. 
In addition t o '.tt!e _ _j'l~y __ ~f. _T,r1:!th the r e is a second 
path, a pa th more frequently pursued by mortal k ind, ~he 
. 16 17 
vfa.y Qf _OJ21!!1on (or "Belief", or ''Seeming" ) , ba s ed on 
1. T hill~, HP, 29. 
2. Webb, HP, 39. 
3. Adamson, DGP, 32. 
4. Burnet, EGP, 180. 
5. McClure, EPG, 152. 
6. Rus sell, HWP, 49. 
7. Scoon, GPBF , 80. 
8. Ueberwe g , HP, 56. 
9. Tur ne r , HP, 47. 
10. Ferrier, ~v, II, 106. 
11. Freeman, APSP, 42. 
12. Co r nford, PP, 29. 
13. Marita in, I P , 61. 
14. Jae ger, P, I, 175. 
15. Scoon, GPBP, 65, 68. 
16. Burnet, EGP , 176. 
17 . Cor n f o r d , F P , 3 3 . 
the diverse, confused, a nd eve r cha ng i ng appe ~rances 
pre s ented by senso ry e xperience, influenced by habit, 
the bodily condition, variable, fleeting , unce rt~ in, 
a wo r l d of p~urality and i n stability that is little 
1,2,3,4 
mo re t han a dream of the one true e xistence. 
5 
This view can n ever predomi nate, for it is merely a 
6 
deceptive order o f words. 
7,8 
s econd "way." 
T ~ere is no t r uth in this 
Why, t hen, d oes Parmenides s top his exposition 
9 
of his "reliable theory" and concern himself with a 
l ong d escription of wha t s e ems to mis guid ed mo r t a ls? 
Xhe W~y_of OQi n iog is ~n outline of the pr inciple tenets 
C:lf Pytha gore a n cosmology, and it includ es ( l) 'I'T ha t seems 
re a l or appears t o t he s enses, ( 2) wha t se e ms t r ue, and 
10 
( 3 ) wha t see ms ri g ht to men. The phi l osop her as p i r ing 
ll 
41 
a fte r t ruth mus t inquire i n t o eve r yt hing ; he must l earn 
12 
the opin ion s of morta l s a n d " g o t hro ug h a ll the t h ings-
13 
tha t- s eem wit hout e x c e p tion . a nd t est tae.m, " st}A.dy i n g the 
1'/0rld order of p he nomena 11 in order t ha t n o intellect of 
14 
man may outstri p h i m." The opinions of men re gardin g 
see mi ng t hings may be a ssembled into a system which, if 
l. 
2. 
3· 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7· 
Cocker, CGP, 307-308. 
Robin , GT, 85. 
Thilly, HP, 29. 
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not true, is at le ast plausible, a phase on the 
way to 'r he 1tlay· of 1'_r_utq, thro ugh which every philosopher 
must pass. 
Pa r menides had no pat1ence with criteria of truth 
other than r eason. He d ismissed the feelin g or i ntui-
tion of men as a t'perplexity in their bosoms tha t ] 
3 
steers their intelligence away. tt He never tired of 
castiga ting opinion and those who were carried along 
4 
with the deaf, blind, amazed, and uncritical hordes, 
who bowed to habit or the conventions tha t mortals had 
5,6 
established. Where a s Parmenides 1 predeces sors had 
been merely agnostic about the validity of sense-per-
ce ption, he plainly insisted that it was deceptive and 
7,8,9,lO,ll,l2 
could not be trusted. To regard truth 
as being g iven by the s ense-perce ption is to identify 
13 
Being with non-Being. Yet what-seems-to-be is identi-
cal with what-is-not, and of all the human f aculties 
14 
reason alone is connected to what-is. 
Parmenides also recognized tha t language was in-
e xtricably associa ted with the thinking processes. For 
him the unthinkable and the inexpressible were Sy.inony-
l. Gomperz, GT, I, 181. 
2. Scoon, GPBP, 79-80. 
3. Freeman, APSP, 43. 
4. Freeman, APSP, 43. 
5. Freeman, APSP, 44. 
6. Dmog. Laert., LEP, II, 431. 
7. Fairbanks, FPG, 108. 
8. Freeman, PSP, 144. 
9. Scoon, GPBP, 130. 
10. Turner, HP, 47-48. 
ll. Ueberweg, HP, 54. 
12. Webb, HP, 39. 
13. Thilly, HP, 28. 
14. Scoon, GPBP , 80. 
l 
mous, and, converse ly , in a positive sense, "To think 
is the same as the th )Ug ht that It Is, f or you will not 
2 
find thinking vvithout Being ••• " Both tho ught and lan-
g uage r e quire objects outside of themselves, and when a 
43 
word is used si gn ificantly its object must i n s ome sanse 
3 
e xist. True names corres pond to what really exists, and, 
by the same to ken, that-which-is-~ ot is not ca pable of ut-
4 
te .:·anc e . Yet, while words are essential t o communication, 
pos sib l y even for the conceptuali zati on of truth, they are 
not an unmixed blessing , for their imp~oper use g ives rise 
5 
to f a lsehood. ~·1ortals are deluded i n to accepting the 
names that they ha ve established, tha t they have conven-
tiona lly assigned to a p pearances, as real itie s 11 ••• tha t 
6 
is whe r e they have g :me astray. 11 Th~ W~y_ o f_ _ Opinion thus 
7,8,9 
reduces to a "de ceptive order of words." 
Re a son was Parmenides' sole c r iterion of truth. He 
elucidated a philos op hical system so coherent, so self-
consistent, that he could boast, "It is a ll the same for 
me f r om what point I begin, for I s hall re turn again to 
10 
the s ame point." But fo:r all its e x cellence his system 
had -me flaw, a fatal flaw. r:rhe lrlay_of _'J'ruth was too d if-
ficult. It is too much to demand of men that they turn 
thei r backs upon the e xperience whth is c a joling them and 
l. Freeman, APSP, 43. 
2. Freeman, APSP, 44. 
3. Russell, ~NP, 49-50. 
4. Cornford, PP, 34. 
5. Russell, WNP, 50-51. 
6. Freeman, APSP, 44, 46. 
7. Freeman, APSP, 44. 
8. Cornford, PP, 33-34, 45. 
9. Ueberweg, HP, 54. 
10. Freeman, SPSP, 43. 
pressing on every side. Farmenides in his que·st for truth 
f ollowed reason wherever it led, not hesitating a moment 
when r eason demanded that he set all common sense at de-
fiance, i gnore sensory evidence as illusion, and embrace 
conclusions violently a t odds with all common sense and 
1,2,3,4,5 
expe r ience. Par menides' method was alien to the 
growing i nterest in experimentation. Subse·quent genera-
tions were t o agree with Ari&totle that Parmen1des' ap-
proach wa s not tha t of science, tha t b.e was an "anti-
6 
naturalist." E~en Parmen.ides ·' own pupils, being unable 
to perceive the master's grand ·schemes, were to re uu·ce his 
philosophy to empty, nega tive eristics and the old Ionian 
naturalism. Parmenides was a man much too profound for 
his times. 
Zeno and Melissus 
Ze-no of Elea was the favorite pupil, friend, and some 
7,8,9,10,11,12 
say adopted son of Par me n ides. Yet for all 
his devotion to his maste r he lost eight of Parmen1des' 
purpose, clinging only to the great Eleatic's methodology, 
the scythe of l ogic which in the pupil's hands became, not 
44 
a criterion of truth, but a c r ite r ion of f alsehood. Parman-
1. Corn f ord, PP, 28. 
2. Ma r- 1ta1n, IP, 62. 
7. Diog. Laert., LEP, II, 433. 
8. Fa i rbanks, FPG, 112. 
3. Scoon, GPBP, 72. 
4. Webb, HP, 39-40. 
9. Pla to , So ph. , 241D. 
10. Ritter, HAP, I, 469. 
5. Windelband, R~P, 63. 
6. _Corn fCD"rd, PP , 28. 
11. Snider, AEP, 103. 
12. Turner, HP, 49. 
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ides' pos i tion was immedie t ely assailed f r om eve r y s i d e. 
Ze no f e lt ob k i ged to de fend his b eloved teacher's pr i n -
cip les again st these a t ta ck e r s. Zeno's a rguments we r e 
no t c onstructed i n the s p irit o f wa nton paradox, but 
1 
ra ther a s r e p lies to thos e who " made fun" of Parme n i des. 
Pa rmenides' method had l ed h im to deny t h e obv i ous fa ct& 
of human e xpe rtence. This made his stand v ery vunerable 
to ridicule; his views, understand abl y , see med paradoxi-
cal. Zeno 's purpose was to demons trate irrefutably t hat 
t he ten~ts of Par me n i d e s ' d e t r a c t ors when logically pur-
sued le ad to conc l us i ons tha t are even more paradoxical 
2,3,4,5 
than t hos e of h is master. It i s not clear whether 
t he n e 1tr g eometr y s uggested the me t hod of r:ef!.uct!.Q._.§:Q_ _aq-
6 
~~rdu~ to Zeno or he t o it; a t any rate, his defense of 
Ele a tic d octrine wa s bas ed on a ne ga tive app r o a ch and con -
sisted i n de monstra ti ng by deduction that the non-Parmenide a n 
7 8 
presuppositions of p lural ity and motion lead to t h e wild-
9,10,11,12 
e st contradi cti6ns and a bsurdities. 
There can be little do ubt that Zeno 's paradoxes were 
very effective. They were c o nside r ed irrefutable i n their 
14 13 
day. Windelba nd, however, r a ises the followi n g ob-
jection to Zeno' s me thodology: 
1. Lee, ZE, 6-7. 8. F r ee ma n , _A FSP, 47. 
2 . _:. damson, DGP, 37. 9. Lee, ZE, 8-9. 
3. Lee, ZE, 8-9. 10. Scoon, GPBP, 127. 
4. Pl a to, Fa r m., 128C. 11. Turner, HP, 49. 
5. Webb, HP, 40. 12. Uebe r we g , HP, 4 9. 
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Zeno was no longer concerned in apprehending or 
unders tand i ng emp irical r eality •.• He was inter-
ested only in the conceptual defense of the para-
doxes of his teacher. In seeking to discover the 
contrad i ctions 1"/hich inhere i n ordinary opinions 
regarding the plura lity and mutability of things, 
he employed in a more partisan spirit than ~ar­
menides, a r guments not based on subject matter or 
empirical f a ct, but only those of formal logic. 
Nevertheless, for all the negative cha r acter of Zeno's 
efforts, with h im thete first appears a detailed notion 
1 
of the general structure of argument. He well deserved 
the laurel that ':~ ristotle placed upon his brow - the 
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
father of the Dialectic. 
Melissus, a contemporary of Zena and a disciple of 
Parmenides although he may not have a ctually heard the 
10,11,12 
great Eleatic, tried to reaffirm the doctrines 
of Par menides in a more positive manner than Zeno had 
done, taking into account the ar guments of the plural-
13,14 
ists. However, he failed to preserve the essential 
15 
purity of Eleatic doctrine. Rather than complementing 
Zeno's indirect arguments with a direct a nd positive dia-
16 
lectic, he managed only to addle the Eleatic tradition 
17 
by the intr oduction of Ionian physics. 
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IN'hi le the Eleat ics t hemselves are free fr :;m any 
just imputat,ion of skepticism, the charp;e can be laid 
at their feet tha t their doctrines ~ave great impetus 
to the growth o f s ke pticism in the classical world. 
The r e is a direct historical connection between the 
1 
Eleatics and the Sophists and the Skeptics. Zeno, by 
providing those who would misuse it a dialectic una c-
companied by the restraining principles of cri ti cism 
necessary for its fruitful application, paved the way 
f~~ the transition from the dop;matism of Parmenides to 
the relativism of Protagora s and the intellectual 
2,3 
nihilism of Gorg1as. 
Farmenides possessed sufficient intellectual 
courage to abandon sensation completely and proclaim 
reason as his sole cr iterion of truth. But his phil-
osophy was too dif f icult for the epigoni that were to 
follow; it was premature. Premature, for, while he 
47 
made log ic the test of truth, logic was still in a nascent 
sta te. The negative dialectic developed by Zeno was in-
adequate as a medium for the propagat ion of Farmenidean 
metaphysics fo r it was not directed by sufficient philosoph-
leal purpose nor protected by t he stabilizing influence of 
a mature crit i cism. For a fleeting moment reason rode tri-
1. Patrick, GS , 21. 
2. Jogl, GAH , I, 458. 
3. Turner, HP, 52. 
umphant ove r sensation, yet it remained f or Socrates 
to a ttempt to formul a te t he conditions of rational 
1 
knowledge. The metaphysical ke rnel of Parmenidean 
philosophy was almost immediately abandoned while the 
husk, the d i a lectic of zeno, was readily exploited by 
the Sophists. I gnorance of the proper limits of formal 
logic led to a disappointment and disillusionment tha t 
we re a fertile soil fo r ske p ticism. However, the fate 
48 
of Ele at ic speculation was not tota lly tragic. Although 
prepa ring the way for Soph ism and Skepticism, Parmenides 
and his pupils, by t he invention of the dialectic and 
the elaboration of the concept of pure thought, helped 
set the p hilosophical scene fo r the advent of Socrates 
2 
and Plato. 
l. Turner, HP, 49. 
2. Plato, Theaet., 183-184. 
1,2,3 
able, partly i nef f able. Empedocles fre quently com-
50 
4,5 
pla ined of the limita tion s of human knowled ge and be-
lieved two facto r s to be largely responsible: the weak-
n ess of knowled ge's ins t ruments a nd the c ircumsc r ibed 
6,7,8 
n a ture of the i nd ividua l's experience. The mind of 
man is allowed no r est, f or, while t he cognition of the 
mundane wor ld ou~ht to b e the first object of his pur-
9 
suit, he cannot attain any certainty of thoug ht if he 
\ 10 
g ives himself enti r e l y to the wo~ld of sanse~. Emped-
ocles f a iled to distin~uish thoug ht from sensation on a 
11 
clear psycholog ical basis or to establish a conne ction 
between divine knowledge a nd sensory cognition. He did 
ha ve somethin~ to s ay, however, on the physiology of sense-
l4 ~).3 ,14 
pe r ce p tion. But if, a s Empedocles held, sense-
pe rception is "what we think 1trith11 then kno-v1ledge de r ived 
thence will var y with the v a riations of the bodily c o nd i-
15 
tion. This seems t be the mean inp; of the fragment, "In 
so far a s t heir na tures have c hang ed so does it befa ll men 
16 . 
to think cha n ged ~, houghts ." 
For all his lack of esteem for the veracity o f the 
s enses, Empedocles n eve r theless depended heavily on the 
sensory equipment as his principle source of knowledge. 
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1)1 
At this point Empedocles i s f ound to be i n cons istent, or 
at le ast unclear. On the one hand he expre s sed distrust 
o f t he sensory appa r atus, and on the ot her he ple aded tha t 
confiden ce not be withheld f ~o m any of t he sensory c han-
1 
nels. If Empedocles had denied the credibility of the 
senses ~~ to~~ ' it would be difficult, as Butler points 
2 
out, to ac count fo r the estima tion in wh i ch he was held 
by Lucretius and the r emark of Sextus Empiricus tha t he 
held that 11 all the senses are trustworthv ·, if under the 
control of reason." While Par menides thought of proof, 
tha t is to say the criterion of t r uth, a s being iliog ical 
demonstra tion, Empedocles retur ned to sense per ception 
3 
a s his cr ite r io n of truth, asse r ting that, "the intelli-
4 
genes of Man gro-.,.ra towards the materia l that is pre sent," 
and speaking of the eyes and hands as "in truth . . . t he 
5 
best hip;hway of pe r suasion · into the mind of man." Emped-
ocles came to the de f ense of sens ation and attacked Par-
6,7 
menides' rejection of these f aculties: 
But come, 9bserve with every means, to see by which 
way each thing is clear, and do not hold any percep~ 
of sight higher in credibility than [ those] a cord i np; 
to hearing , nor ( set the lo ud-s ounding hear i ng above 
the evidence of the tongue; nor refuse credence at all 
to any of the other l imbs whe r e t here exi s ts a path 
for perception, but use wha tever way of perception 
make s each thing clear. 8 
l. Ful l er, HGP, 197. 
2. Butler, LHAP, 322. 
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No, Empedocles ce r tainly had n o intention of follow i ng 
t he e xa mple of Parmenides a nd fo r s aking sensation a s a 
criterion of truth . On the contrary, .~i. ristotle decla res 
1,2,3 
tha t Emped.ocles identifie d thinkin g and p e r ceiving 
qu i te the opposite extreme from rejecting s e ns a t ion as a 
criterion of truth. 
=ut the evidence of e a ch of the sen sory S ) urces was 
n ot to be exam i n e d s e parate f rom a more ge neral con text. 
Wh i l e the El e atics placed e ~phasis on reason, Emped ocles 
gav e i mportance to refle ction, that is to say, the know-
led g e acquired by all the powers av a ilable to man, sens a -
tion and reason, functi ::; n :i. ng in an i n te rrelated and in-
4 
te gr a ted manner, all the senses trusted equally a nd truth 
5 
obta i n ed by syn optically comparing their data. Thi s was 
a s te p i n t he right direction towards a syn the t ic facul cy 
o f sense, the ~ens u~ QQmmunis, yet, a l t houg h Empedocle s 
did cen te r p e r ce p tion in theheart, · ristotle cri tici e es 
6 ,7 
h i m for fail ing to provide a central coord i nat ing a g ency. 
The practical cours e to b e follo wed be co mes c lear ; 
once mus t c ont i nual l y sense, con t inually e xpe r ien ce under 
t he most perfectly con t r olled cond ition s po s sibl e. In a 
word, one must e xpe l'' L .Jent. .A nd expe r i ment Empedocles did. 
1. ~damson, DGP , 5 8 . 
2. Aristotle, De Anima , 427a2 2. 
3. S coon , GPBF-,- 92.- - -
4. Tu r n e r, HF , 60 . 
5. F r ee man, PSP , 19 7. 
6 . Ar i stotle, De ~nima , 
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7. Beare, GTEC, 150 , 253. 
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In general, ne tried to justify his t heories by marab.alling 
a greater body or factual information than had any or his 
1 
prede-cessors • His method, 1n depending upon detailed 1n-
vestigations and appeal to· sen·se experience, in · contrast to 
that of Parmenide·s, may be properly styled scientific. 
llnasmucb. as· sensation played such an important role 
in Empedocles' e pistemology, it 1s not surprising to find 
t hat b.e devoted considerable attention to the problem of 
a phystolog ical theory · of s·ense-.pereept1on. Briefly, as 
2 
Alcmaeon of Croton had pr·eviously theorized, things pro-. 
duce neffluences" which enter tb.e "poresu or passages Of 
3,4 
the · respact1ve sense organs·, and there, accord'ing to 
Empe'docles 1 very famous hypothesis, like interacts with 
and · ttrus becomes known by like- s1m111a sim111bus cog• 
5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 
nosc untur. Thought, like sense-
perception, occurs by means of stmilars and is thus, as 
15,16 
has been· suggested earlier, similar to sensation. 
Man 1 s superior int-ellect is due to the fact tha. t he is 
the repository of all the cosmic elements and is thus ad-
17 
m1 tted into contact with them and is cognizant of them. 
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.i&.naxagoras of Clazomenae 
Anaxagora s of Clazomenae was influenced by the Ion-
1,2,3 
ians, especially Anaximenes. His own influence was 
wide; on the one hand his "seed" hypothesis gave him a 
4,5 
cla i m to the title of the f a the r of corpuscular physi cs, 
and on the othe r hand his doctrine of Nous made a lasting 6,7 ·-- -
impressiom on the young Socrates. Aristotle set Anax-
ago r as apa·rt, saying that he se emed 11 like a sober man in 
8 ,9 
contrast with the random talk of his predecessors." 
.Anaxagoras' doctr i ne of Nou~, of an intelligent 
principle organizing and directing the cosmos, by re-intro-
ducing a human-like faculty into the scheme of n ature evinced 
a growing interest in physiological and psycholog ical as d is-
10 
tinguished from pure l y cosmological matters. The para.l-
lelism thus suggested between divine and human intelligence 
enabled man to i nfe r truths about nature from truths availa-
ble to him by intros pection, for all mind is of like chara c-
11 
t er, both the less nnd the greater. 
How fortunate it would be, hovv much more light could 
be throm1 upon pre-Socratic s peculation if only Anaxagoras' 
fascinating doctr i ne of 11~~~ had been clarified and developed. 
Unfortunately, however, having once i n troduc$d the concept 
1. Burnet, EGP, 253. 
2. Diog. Laert., LEP, I, 135. 
3. Scoon, GPBP, 95. 
4. Bailey, GAE, 34, 537. 
5. Weber and Perry, HP, 30. 
6. Plato, ~q~ed_Q, 97-99. 
7. Webb, HP, 44. 
8 • . Aristotle, !'1e~., 984bl7. 
9. Turner, HP, 63. 
10. Burne.t, EGP, 268. 
11. Fairbanks, FPG, 241. 
of Nous into his coswology Anaxagoras seems to have been 
most reluctant to exploit it. Aristotle compla ins 
.•• Anaxagoras uses reason as a ~eus e~ ~~china 
for the ma k i ng of the world, and when he 1s at 
a loss to tell fro m what causes something neces-
sarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all 
othe r cases ascribes events to anything ra t her 
tha n to r eason. 1,2 
3 
and Plato voices the same protest in the Laws and in 
- 4 
that very well known passage in the Pha~do. Anaxago r as 
did not consistently work out the details of his doc-
tr i ne of Nou~; on the c )ntrary, he took refuge in mech-
5,6,7,8, 9 ,10,11 
anical explanations wheneve r possible. 
Anaxagoras' reliance on mec han ical representation 
55 
as a pri 'lCiple of explanation indicates that, l:i.ke Emped-
ocles, he placed great store in sense-perception, in ex-
perimentation and the purely mechanical principles d e rived 
the J'efrom. He evide ntly fo und empirical testing a more 
concrete and convincing criterion of truth than re ason. 
Most revealing is the statement of Aristo tle tha t An axa-
goras asserted tha t man is the most intelligent of animals 
because of his hands - the instruments with which he ex-
12 
perirnents. 
1. 
2 • 
3-
4. 
5. 
6. 
Aristotle, Me1., 985al8. 
Ar istotle, De Anima, 405al4. 
Plato, 1_aws-,-9o7B=o. 
Pla to, Phaedo, 97B-980. 
Russell, WNP, 63. 
Scoon, GPBP, 103. 
7-
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Thilly, HP, 36. 
Turner, HP, 63-64. 
Ueberweg, HP, 63. 
Webb, HP, 44. 
rtleber and Perry, HP, 34. 
Aristotle,~~ Pa rt. An., 
687a7. 
But Anaxagora s was not s a ti s fied with the sensory 
equipme nt. Paradoxically he points to an exper i ment to 
illustra te the diffic i encies of the senses: the s enses 
are too weak to disce.rn the gradual change s in color 
which t a ke place when a black a nd a wh ite liquid a r e 
1,2 
mixed dro p by drop. Al thoug h he bemoans the fact 
that "thr ough the weakness of the sense-perceptions , we 
3 4,5 
cannot judge truth," . .&naxagora s was not a s keptic, 
and Cicero erred when he included him among the agnos-
6 
56 
tics. Gra nted the sens es are gro ss and 1t1e ak,' t hey even 
may be mi slead i ng, yet t he i r &vidence is not totally de-
7,8,9,10 ,11 
vo id of value, for , i f they were, it would be 
difficult to unders tand why Anaxagoras took such pains 
12 
t o g ive an elaborate and detailed enumera tion of them, 
and why he ultima te ly appeale d. to t hem whenever possible. 
The difficulty wi th the senses, Anaxagoras felt, was t hat 
they were too blunt tools, they could not make dist inctions 
fine enough, they detected only the predominate qua lities 
i n t hin~s, only those portions tha t preva il, wh i le the more 
recessive qualities escaped them; their reports were only 
13,14,15,16,17,18 
partial. The r e is a certa 1n de gre e of 
1. Freeman, PSP, 273. 
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of truth in sensory appre hension, and so the evidence tha t 
appearances offer may be utilized in seein~ the invisible, 
t ha t is to s ay, as a standard for the cogni tion o f the 
1,2,3 
non-apparent. "Vis ible e x istences are a sight of the 
4 
unseen." 
The details of Anaxagoras' theory o f sensation are 
interesting. Unlike Empedocles who thought that perception 
was produced by t he i n teraction or like with like ( homoeo-
pathism), Anaxagora s held j ust the opposite op inion tha t 
like cannot a ffect like and thus sensory perception must 
be p r oduced by the intera ction of unlike qualities (al l o-
5,6,7,8,9,10,11 
pathism). This theory that sensa t ion de-
12 
pends on irr ita tion by 9pposites has an intriguing con -
sequence: when a thin~ is known it is differentiated from 
13 
its opposite, hence knowledge becomes discrimination. 
Wha t of mind, of r eason? Anaxagoras is strangely 
reticent and obscure on this s ubject, the very ma tter which 
should have be en the crux of his philosophy. He p ictured 
reason as a more p r e c ise instrument to supplement the cruder 
senses, as a sort of microscope held up to na·t ural proces-
14 
ses, and as a re pository of "experience , memory, and 
1. Burnet, EGP, 274-275. 
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1 
wisdom." Anaxa gora s says tha t reas on, v-rhich is unmixed, 
i s the only f a culty by which one can see eve r ything in 
2,3 
everythin~ and so become co~nizant of the truth. 
Little is said of the way in wh~ch reason functions; 
truth may be discovered by reason through contemplati on 
4 
independent of sensory perception, and throu~h it the 
individual can s omehow participa te in the wo r ld reason 
5,6 
to which all is known. Reason is t he re gula tive ·· 
f a culty of the mind just as Mou~ is that of the uni-
verse. Yet neithe r sense nor reason alone is gro und for 
ce r titude; the f ormer perceives phenomena, the latter 
7 
noumena. Further details of ~naxagoras ideas a r e wanting. 
Empedocles for all his claims of divine d e scent and 
heavenly il l umina tion, for a ll his p hysiolog ical and psycb.o-
log ical t heories, had little better to offer a s a c r ite r ion 
of truth than sensation. In like manner Anaxagoras, as if 
distrustful of h~s own promising doctrine of ~pus, had 
little better to offer than, a 2:.ain, s ensation. Both, while 
reacti~S~ a ga inst Eleaticism, f a iled to produce a superior 
c ~nce pt of reason than that of Parmenides. Philosop hy fell 
b a ck to the obvious, to sensation as a crite rion of truth, 
to t hose f a culties by whmh the bewildering multi plicity of 
1. Fr eeman, APSP, 86. 
2. Ritter, HAP, I, 312-315. 
3. Turner, HP, 64. 
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appearances was most immediately apprehended. The stage 
was set for the final development of sensation as t he 
criterion of t r uth by the Atomists and for that tragic 
admission of episte mological failure - the relativism of 
the Sophists. 
60 
Chapter VI 
THE .ATOMISTS 
Placing the Atomists in proper perspective with the 
body of pre-Socratic specula tion is smmething of a prob-
lem. ~he ma terialism of the Atomists was one of the t hree, 
great, positive, synthet ic philosophies of ancient Greece, · 
being comparable to the monumental systems of Plato and 
Aristotle. At least one au tho r ity places the work of Demo-
critus posterior to and in opposition to the Protagorean 
1 
r e lativism, and if chrono~ogy be discarded in favour of 
what per ha ps seems the natural course of intellectual 
development, this may well be justified. Yet there is 
g~od evidence that t he Atomists' theory of sensation, along 
with the Heraclite an flux and the Eleatic dialectic, was 
2 
one of the major ingredients of Sophism. 
Part of the explanation for this anomaly lies i n the 
fact tha t the Sophists adopted the ne gat ive f"ea)\ture s of 
materialistic s ensualism while i gnoring t he positive meta-
physics of the Atomis ts, jus t a s i n the case of the Elea tics. 
Thus the philosophical mainstream fell i nt o the abyss of 
sophistica l dispair fo r the mo s t part oblivious that one 
of the principle solutions to the problems tha t thre atened 
to ove r whelm phil 8sophy had already b een e l ucida ted. 
l. McClur e, EPG, 205. 
2. We ber and Perry, HP, 40. 
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Leucippus of Abdera 
Leucippus of Abdera has - remained · an- obs-cure· figure, 
very much over-shadowed by his pupil Democrttus·. Even 
one' of his l a. ter followers, Epicurus·, flatly ass·erted 
tna t "th·ere ·· never wa s such a person as a philosopher 
. 1,2 
Leuc1ppus ." Yet- Aristotle did not question the exis-
tence of Leucippus and, in addittonto mentioning him 1n 
several places, spoke of Democr1tus as "his associate'! 
thus suggesting tha. t · Leucippus was the founder of the 
3 
atomic school at Abdera. ·· 
Leuctppus· se-ems to -have CQllle from M1letus and to 
have flotirished around tb:e middle of - the · ft ·fth century, 
4,5,6,7 
B. C. There is no·· conc·lus·ive evidence· to indi-
cate that his doctrines were· largel y derived, as· might 
8,9 
be expected, from the •tseed" hypothesis of .Anaxagoras. 
Aristotle held that · the opinions · of the Atomists tookr-.; 
their origin in the Eleat1c denial o r the vo id, and this 
view appears reasonable for Leucippus is said to have 
10,11,12,13,14 
been the · pup11 of Zeno. 
Aristotle wr ote that: 
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Leucippus ••• thought he h8.d a theory which har-
monized with sense perception and wauld not abol-
ish either coming-to-be and passing-away or mo-
tion and the multiplicity of things. fie made 
these concessions to the f a cts o f perception ••• 1 
The ut!EOst signif icance may be atta ched to this remark, 
for the kernel of the problem of a criterion of truth as 
it existed fo r t he pre-Socratics was a dissatisfaction 
wi tb. the adequacy of sense-perception . V'Ti th Xenophanes 
and more especially Heraclitus this difficulty was clearly 
recogn izee! and, together with the problems of change, the 
one and the many, and substance, had formed the basis of 
subsequent Greek thought. Its· reeul t, prior to the three 
great synthetic philosophies, was t o produce on the one 
hand Sophism, which was virtually an admission of failure 
t o s 0lve the prGblem of truth and its cr i teria, and, on 
the other hand, the dogma of the Eleatics who, overawed 
by the shortc omings of sensation, gr asped the only other 
philosophical crite r i on of truth with whi ch they were 
familiar, logic, and clung to it so tenaciously that they 
were ready to follow whe r ever it lead, even if in so doing 
they had to deny the obvious f acts of experience. However, 
the 11 facts" of sense experience, chimerical thoug 'a. they 
may be, must be rescued. One cannot simply dismiss one 
faculty, sensat ion, as fa ulty while subscribing to the in-
fallible validity of another faculty, reason, equally as 
1. Aristotle, De Gen. et Cor., 325a24. 
human. 
Tb:e A t ·omists· re:...examined and· re""evaluate'd snnse·-
perception a·s · a cr iterion of trutb:, study i ng · the tssue 
freshl y wi tn unprecedented thoroughness·. They did· not 
rashly- dtsmtss sens·atton as · a source of mere opin ion 
as tne·1r Ele-attc prede-cessors had · d o-ne, nor d1d ·t hey· 
equally- rasb.ly embra o·e · s ·ens·atton· as the way of · truth as 
Empedoc·les-· and- Anaxae;oras had ·done for all pract teal 
purpos·es. Their · attitude may be typified as one of ex-
tre·mely· ·· caut1ous · interest. But · e-ven this· r-e-served tn-
teres·t ·; skeptical though- 1 t may have be-en was a new and 
pro-mising departure from the traditions-- of unmitigated 
e mpirtc'i sm and rationalism• In their synthetic · p-hiloso-
phy· the A to·mtsts made -- cons·ide·rable progress by- adopting, · 
not the- ·vices·· as tne· Soplrl:sts had done, but rather the 
vtrtu·es of these · tradtttons. 
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While -studying ·the potentialities · of sensat·ion with 
great care the Atomists dtd not make it the foundation of 
the 1r phtlo·so·phy .- The· two ul t1mate -- realities admi-tted b y 
Leucippus and b.is school, atoms and the vo1d, were ne-1 ther 
susce-ptible to sensory apprehension• The Eleatics had 
argued that the latter, inasmuch. as it was what-is-not wa·s 
not even susceptible to rational apprehension. Leucippus 
affirmed that what-is and what-is-not were both equally 
t I -1,2 
real in direct opposk1on to theEleatics. 
1. Burnet, EGP, 333. 
2. Burnet, GP, 95. 
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Evidence of the by no means meager residuum ot 
skepticism that the Atomists persisted in nurturing 
towards sense-.perception is to be found in their fas-
cinating doctrine that the objects of sense-perception 
exist by 11 convention11 or "use." Leucippus is given 
1,2,3,4,5 
credlit as the inventor of thi& thesis, and of 
it Democritus says: 
Sweet exists by C:Jnvention, bitter by convention, 
C:)lor by c :mvention; atoms and void [ alone] exist 
in reality ••• We know nothing accurately in 
reality, but[only] as it changes according to 
the bodily condition, and the constitution of 
those things that flow upon [ the body ] and impinge 
upon it. 6 
Tb.e use of the term "convention" is perhaps unfortunate 
for it immediately brings to mind contemporary conven-
tionalism. Parmenidea had said that colors and the like 
7,8 
were only namea, but it seems more likely that the 
conventionalism of the Atomists was not this type ot 
nominalism but rather a criticism on the accuracy ~f 
sense-perception based upon a distinction between primary 
9,10,11,12 
and secondary qualities. 
Th.e Atomists were most emphatic in att ributing the 
order of the universe to necessity rather than chance. 
Leuc1ppue affirmed, 11 Notb.ing happens at random; every-
1. Bailey, GAE, 105-106. 
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1,2 
thing happena out of reason and by necessity." .~nd 
Democr1tus added, "Men have fashioned an image of chance 
3,4 
a s an excuse fo r their own stupidity." " Chance is 
generous but unreliable. Nature, howeve r , is self-suf-
5,6 
fi cient." Bo~h were at pains to reject both c hance 
and teleology as explanations of tbe wor ld about them, 
and as an alternative they embraced necessity in the fund-
7,8,9 
amental sense of natural law. This doctrine of 
necessity, which in the hands of Democritua became "the 
- 10 
most fully scientific conception in Greek pn1losophy," 
was "one of the sources from which science derived its 
11 
belief in natural law." 
But what is the relation of necessity to the prob-
lam of criteria of truth? .Any manner of world order will 
at least set the stage for truth, for knowledge, will at 
least establish the possibility of evants coming into be-
ing rationally, not accident ily. Necessity provides a 
fixed framework for all phenomena and is based on princi-
ples reasona~lp i ntelligible to numan reason. The fixed 
framework admits of the possibility of truth; the simplic-
ity and universality of the principle of ne cessity pro-
motes its likelihood. Then too, necese1ty 1s intimately 
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rela ted· to logic ·as · a· criterion o·f trutb., for necessity 
is the logic of the natural order. 
Democritus of Abdera 
Democrttus of Abdera was the pupil of Leuctppus, 
and apparent-ly he learned his· master 1 s lessons well for 
66 
he elaborat-ed atomistic- speculation into a philospphtc 
system that· 11 answere-d bett·er than any other current theory 
the problems· of his own day" and that attained "a greater 
. 1 
logical coh:e·re-nce than any other ancient system. tt 
There are two classical interpretattons of Democri-
tus 1 theory of knowl edge; there 1s firstly that of Ar-is-
totle who asserte-d that Democri tu,s claimed that all kn·=>W-
ledge is derived from experienc-e, that the phenomenal is 
the only reality apprehe,nded, and who criticized the Atom-
2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
ists on the basis of this position; and· se-
condly, to swing· from · the extreme· of phenomenalism to the 
opposite pole of skepticism, there is the interpretation 
of Sextus Empiricus who, a skeptic himself, tried to pre-
9,10,11 
sent Democritus as holding views similar to his own. 
Aristotle se ems to have been shocked by the Democritean 
i dent if i cation of reason· with the soul and may have based 
12,13 
his er:s-timation on this reaction. Plutarcn claims that 
1. Farrington, GS, I, 60. 
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3. Aristotle, De Anima, 404a27. 
4. Arist :J tle, Met., 1009bl4. 
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10. Bailey, GAE, 177-179. 
11. Gomperz, GT, I, 359. 
12. Aristotle, De Anima, 
404a.27. 
13. Th1lly, HP, 40. 
67 
.Aristotle was speaking of an early theory which the ·atom-
ist later abandoned. This l a tter possibility finds sup-
port in the complaint of Theophrastus that Democr.i tus in 
one of his treatises set out by "pompously announcing his 
intention of proving the truth of the senses which in the 
1 
sequel of the same treatise he entirely subverts." The 
other view, that Democritus was a skeptic, was s upported 
also by Colotes who "tried to prove Democr1tus a skeptic 
-
by quoting him as s aying, ' An object is not naturally 
constituted in one way any more than in another."' But 
here again Democri t us was referring to secondary quali-
2 
~te$ whose reality he did indeed deny • 
... i\ lthough some scholars have come dangerously close 
to following the lead of Sextus, declaring that Democri-
3,4 
tus doctrine s were even anti-philosophical, many more 
sch~lars, while admitting a skeptical cast to the atom-
5,6,7,8 
1st ~ s thought, insist that he was not a skeptic. 
Furthermore, it is more than unlikely that a confirmed 
skeptic would take the greatest pains to construct so elab-
orate a philosophy, and in part i cular such detailed theories 
of sensation and knowledge, as Democritus did. 
At first glance, on the basis of the De mocritean frag-
1. Butler, LHAP, 310. 
2. Gomperz, GT, I, 359-360. 
3. Cocker, CGP, 293. 
4. Ritter, P~P, I, 567. 
5· Batley, GAE, 180. 
6. Freeman, PSP, 310. 
7. Gomperz, GT, I, 359· 
8. Ueberweg, P~, I, 10. 
1,2 
mente, the ·oase fG>r ske·pticism appears overwhelming, 
but upon closer inspection of these fragments one finds 
tha t Democritus did not claim that there was no truth. 
His position is that of agnosticism r a ther t han skepti-
3 
cism. There is a reality, but man 1s severed fro m it; 
4,5 
there is t r uth, but it lies in an abyss. 
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Democritus made a dichotomy between true and f a l se 
knowledge strongly reminiscent of Parinenides • "Way of 
6 
Truth" and "Way of Opinion. 11 His faith in the reality 
of atoms and the void suggest• that his "skepticism" d id 
7 
not extend to them. Genuine knowledge has as its object 
the genu inely real --atoms and the void. Yet atoms and 
-'\ 
the void lie beyond the reach of sense in that sub-phen-
omenal · realm from which the phenomena arise. They are 
not ausc§lptible to sensory appre hension; consequently 
only intellectual concepts of these absolute, unchanging, 
universal realities and the understanding of their move-
ments and primary qualities, the application of correct 
rather than habitual terms to them, can give rise to truth, 
truth which, by virtue of the immutable nature and unive r -
sality of its referents, has claim upon, not the ~nsent 
8,9,10,11,12 
of part i cular men, but or all men for all time. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
Bailey, GAE, 178-179. 
Freeman, APSP, 92-93. 
Freeman, APSP, 92. 
Freeman, APSP, 104. 
Cf. Aristotle, Met., l009bl2. 
Freeman, APSP, 93. 
7. Ueberweg, HP, I, 70. 
8. Bailey, GAE, 180. 
9. Burnet, GP, 198. 
10. Ferrier, PW, II, 163. 
11. Ritter, HAP, I, 562-565. 
12. Robin, GT, 113-114. 
I 
Thought, rather than sensation, is "The Way of 
. 1 
Truth," and reason (logos), ~Thich he called "clear 
- . . 
knowledge, 11 is Democritus' guiding criterion of truth. 
- -
Obscure or 11 bastard 11 k..YJ.owledge, on the other hand, be-
longs t o the domain of the senses and deale with the 
3,4 
qualities of things, not with quantities which are 
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2 
the only differences which truly exist in nature, being 
t he pro9ert1es of the atoms themselves of which all 
5 
things are com] oeed. The knowledge which arises from 
' 
the senses ielittle more than opinion; "it is obscure, 
as if we were alway·s looking at things in the dark and 
6 
could only see their vague configurations;" it repre-
sents only a · 11 shadowy diversity of i . ernal impressions 
7 
which can cla i m no real archetype." • 
The question naturally oc·curs at thl1s point, how 
does one acquire genuine knowledge? The answer is: 
"Through·~- reason." But reason gathers its material from 
the data of the senses. · You cannot condemn the latter 
8 
without damaging the former. Still, if reason takes its 
information from the senses, and the senses can give rise 
only to bastard knowledge, it would seem that the case 
9 
for skepticism 1s complete. 
1. Scoon, GPBP, 216. 6. Scoon, GPBP, 217. 
2. Adamson, DGP, 64-65. 7. Butler, LHAP, 309. 
3. Adamson, DGP, 64-65. 8. Freeman, APSP, 104. 
4. Ritter, HAP, I, 562. 9. Bailey, GAE, 179. 
5. Ferr ier, PW, II, 161-163. 
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Democritus was understandably reluctant to assume 
the respnnsibility of absolutely denying the truth of 
sensory lmowledge, for he recognized sensory experience 
1,2 
as the ultimate source of knowledge: 
••• the way to truth. lay through sense-perception 
rightly understood ••• all [sense] percepts are 
true in the sense that they are due to actual events; 
t hey are different to healthy animals and ourselves, 
and different at different times to t he same person, 
but this is due to the differences in the receiv ing 
organs; the cause of perceptions remains a reality, 
and in that sense all percepts are "equal", and one 
set is not more real than another. -3 
Even the gods manifest themselves through the images wl1 ich 
4 
strike our.1 senses. Like Anaxagoras, Democritus held that 
one could proceed by inductive inferences based on analogy, 
premising that the forces and qualities obtained by sense-
perception were valid beyond the~imits of sensation, from 
I 
appearances, perceptible facts, phe :~omena, to a knowledge 
of the unappare nt, of the unknown, thus overstepping the 
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 11 • • • I h 
limits of sensation in space and time. " ••. The 
'criterion' for the apprehension of things unseen is phen-
10 -
omena." 
Progress along such an arduous "Way of Truth" is 
facilitated by the fact that uthe atoms outside us [can_j · 
affect tha atoms of our soul directly without tne inter-
1. Gomperz, GT, I, 363. 
2. Ritter, HAP, I, 565. 
3· Freeman, PSP, 310. 
4. Ueberweg, HP, I, 70. 
5• Bailey, GAE, 183. 
6. Freeman, PSP, 310 7. Gomperz, GT, I, 3~2. 
8. Ritter, HAP, I, 565. 
9. Ueberweg, HP, I, 70. 
10. Bailey, GAE, 183. 
1 
vent1on of the organs of sense •11 When such immediate com-
munication occurs and the motions of tb.e soul are syrnmetri-
2,3,4 
cal, rational knowledge results. This last doctrine, 
as did Empedocles' principle that like knows like, may sug-
gest an inner sens·e as a crtt·erion of truth· which may be a 
5 
sort o·f intuition or even just common sense. 
Lacking ideal or even satisfactory instrume·nts and 
precision for determining truth, Democritua bemoaned the 
6 
fact that t ·ne fruit of all his labor was s·o me-age r . 
71 
The reproach that he levelled at the senses collect-
ively was that their evidence did not extend far enough; 
tha·t they deserted us at the pGints where the minutest 
-bodie·s and the most· delicate processes were to be got 
~t from which the material masses and the processes ob-
taining in them are composed. 7 
While denying the objective reality of secondary qualities, 
Democr-:ttus never· for a moment questioned the objective ex-
istence of bodies and thei r attributes; he· rejected any sort 
of arbitrary or relativistic "plebisite-'' for determining the 
truth and affirmed that the various grades of reality could 
8,9 
be measured by a theory of sense-perception. Democritus 
was not a skeptic; he was a logical empiricist who, dismayed 
by the inadequacy of the scientific equipment and knowledge 
of his times, was not above venting his pique in despairing, 
agnostic aphorisms. 
1. Burnet, GP, 198. 
2. Bailey, GAE, - 183. 
3. Scoon, GPBP, 218. 
4. Ueberweg, HP, I, 70. 
5. Burnet, GP, 198. 
6. Gomperz, GT, I, 359, 362. 
7. ~OMpa:r~, GT, I, 361-362. 
8. Gomperz, GT, I, 359-360. 
9. Freeman, PSP, 310. 
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Tb.e Atomi sts, then, adopted and shaped into a cob.erent 
philosophi cal position many of the positive d i s·cove r ies of 
t heir predecessors. Like tb.e Milesian naturalists and Em-
pedocles and Anaxagor as t hey relied b.eavily upon sensory 
observations to fill in the details of their system. But, 
fully aware of the shortcomings or sensation as a criterion 
of truth, t hey followed the lead of the Eleat1cs by making 
the underlying principles of their philosophy known by 
reason. And, finally, like the Pytb.agoreans, they made the 
particular qualities apprehended by the senses dependent 
upon universal, rationally apprehended quantities. 
Chapter VII 
THE SOPHISTS 
73 
The &reek thinkers had set out with high hopes of 
knowing everything, and climbing the sky of wisdom 
in a single step. As a result of this immoderate 
ambition, and because they lacked discipline and 
restraint in handling ideas, their concepts were 
embroiled in a confused strife, an interminable 
battle of opposing probabilities. The immediate 
and obvious result of these attempts at philoso-
phising seemed the bankruptcy of speculative thought. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that this period of 
elaboration produced a crisis in the history of 
thought, at which an intellectual disease imperilled 
t he very existence of philosophic speculation. This 
intellectual disease was sophistry, that is to say, 
the corruption of philosophy. 1 
The "causes" of Sophism were legion. Sophism was 
the inevitable catastrophe towards which pre-Socratic spec-
ulation heedlessly swept. The whole panorama of Greek in-
tellectual history was but the stage setting for a colossal 
philosophic and cultural calamity - Sophism- but also, lest 
the key be too minor, mankind's supreme intellectual tri-
umphs - Plato and Aristotle. To write in detail, then, of 
the ca uses of Sophism would be a task of encyclopaedic pro-
portions, involving a description, not only of the evolution 
of Greek philosophy, but of the entire social, political, 
cultural, and economic h i story of ancient Greece as well. 
It is possible, howeve r , to atte mpt to isolate the principle 
philosophi cal causes of Sophism. 
1. Maritain, IP, 64-65. 
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Paradoxically, ironically, the principle cause of 
Sophism was Eleaticism; an absolutist philo~ophy gave 
birth to a. relativistic philosophy. Heracliteanism might 
be called the thesis, Parmenidea.nism the anti thesis. The 
synthesis was thre e fold, the three great, positive philos-
ophies or Democr itus, Plato, and Aristotle. Sophism was 
the expression of inefficacy, of desptir, and flourished 
1n that interval after the incompatibility of the opposites 
had been recognized but before the resolution of the syn-
thesis had been envisioned. 
Th.e discre·panc1es between the conclusions of Eleat1c 
metaphysics and human experience profoundly i mpressed the 
1 
e~rly Sophists and gave great impetus to their movement. 
The demands made by Parmen1dean theory, d~epite the apol-
ogies of Zeno and Melissus, were simply too severe. Phil-
osophy was not ready nor willing to turn its back on 1m-
mediate experience and follow Parmenides' narrow and d1f-
ficult path. Yet while spurning the Eleatic metaphysics, 
the Sophists were only too eager to accept the Elea.tic dia-
lectic. 
But why should the disintegration of Parmenidean meta-
physics have had such a deleterious effect on Greek specu-
lation? Certainly there were plentl y of other philosophical 
views available as alternatives, each proffering its res-
pective virtues. That was just th trouble. There were too 
many customs and philos0phica.l opinions; there was a virtual 
1. Scoon, GPBP, 130. 
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1,2 
philosophical Babel. How could anyone arbitrate among 
the nearly endless diversity of op1n~on? Perhaps they all 
had some element or truth; perhaps they we r e all totally 
f alse. It was a time for intellectual inventory. Ph1los-
ophy, espectally cosmology, seemed to be more a property 
of philosophers than Of Nature. Consequently the faith Of 
men in unive r sally valid truth was shaken, and the possib i l-
3,4 
ity of any certain knowledge became very remote. 
Remote also, hopelessly remote, seemed the proud 1deal 
ot an objective science. Such an intellectual Nirvana no 
longer s eemed within mortal grasp. And so the Sophists 
turned away from natural science; the more moderate Sophists, 
like Prota.goras, abandoning theo r etit!al science for a sub-
ject1ve empiricism; the most extre me, like Gorgias, espous-
5,6 
ing the empty husk of Eleat1c dialectic. The emphasis 
turned fro m Na ture and focused on Man, from knowledge to a 
theory of knowledge, fro m physics to psychology. 
In reaction against t. he Parmenidean Immutable One the 
7,8,9,10 
Heraclitean doctrine of f l ux was revived, and this 
doctrine provided a metaphysical basis for the new re lat~vism 
11 
ot Protagoras. The view of Protagoras' friend and fellow 
12 
townsman Democb1tus, that secondary qualities reside not 1n 
1. Schiller, Art. ( 1911). 
2. Scoon, GPBP, 130. 
7. Freeman, PSP, 348-349. 
8. Robin, GT, 140. 
3. Scoon, GPBP, 312. 
4. Windelband, HAP, 116. 
5. Burnet, GP, 107, 115, 119. 
6. .r?.obin, GT, 140. 
9. Watson, Art. (1907). 
10. Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 
11. Burnet, EGP, 166. 
12. Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 
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1 
things but in the sentient mind of man and that reason is 
2 
simply a continua tion of sensation, comple-ted the picture. 
"The skepticism [ redativ1sm? ] of Protagoras represents· the 
conclusion of a syllogism of which Heraclitus' doctrine of 
flux f orms the ma j or, and the sensualism of Democritus the 
3 
minor, premise." 
On the other hand, however, Sophism, especially as in 
4 
the case of Frotago r as, was a"great educa tional moveme nt." 
Yet of even greater value to philosophy than the humanistic 
and educa~ional empb.asis of the Sophists was the spirit of 
criticism they fostered. The pr e-Sophistic thinkers tacitly 
assumed that there was a body of universal and absolute 
truth which man had only to discover. They sought this truth 
assiduously, so assiduously that they never paused, or at 
least did so rarely, to take stock of the adequateness of 
their equipment. The Sophists did precisely this, thereby 
rendering philosophy a necessary, if painful, service. 'l' .. i e ·e 
Their age was one or critical -refl ection. They examined the 
powers of t he intellect itself and discovered that truth and 
reality are not something purely external to thinking and 
feelin g , but that the $ind of man is an importaht factor 1n 
the process of knowing, that human unde r standing is a never 
5,6 
negligible coefficient 1n the production of knowledge. 
1. Ferrier, PW, II, 190-191. 4. 
2. Weber and Perr y, HP, 40-41. 5· 
3. Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 6. 
Jaeger, P, I, 286 et ~· 
Thilly, HP, 46 • . 
Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 
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Protagoras 
Protagoras, the most famous of the Sophists, was a 
fellowtownsman and perhaps a triend and pupil of Democri-
1,2 
tus, yet his philosophy more closely resembles that 
of Heraclitus rather than the materialistic determinism 
. 3 
of the Atomists.# He led the Sophists in their abandon-
ment of the natural sciences in favour of classical ed-
4,5 
ucation, in the transition from naturalism to humanism. 
The paradoxes posited by Eleatic metaphysics made 
the attainment of truth seem impossible and philosophic 
6 
speculation vain; they provoked widespread skepticism. 
Why, then, should man occupy himself with such unreward-
1ng pursuits? Why not devote himself to his most immed-
7 
iate interests, to the cond1tions of his happinese·'f Why 
not, in the face of the multitude of philosophical dogma, 
make a declaration of independence, a mani~esto proclaim-
S 
ing the spiritual automomy of the individual? If man 
cannot escape from the limits imposed by his nature, why 
repudiate the s~le truth that is within the compass or his 
powers? Ratner let each man make the most of such faculties 
9 
as are available to him. 
And what equipment does man have at his disposal? 
Sensation. Sensation alone and little more, for had not 
1. Diog. Laert., LEP, II, 463. 6. Benn, GP, 74. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 7. Weber and Perry, HP, 41.42. 
3. Benn, GP, 73. 8. Schil ler, Art. (1911). 
4. Benn, GP, 75, 77- 9. Gomperz, GT, I, 453-454. 
5. Jaeger, P, I, 300. 
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Damocritus shown ( a t least as Protagoras chose to interpret 
. -
him) that eva n re ason was little more -than the continuation 
1,2 
of sensation? Sense-perception is the only mode of ap-
prehension, the only sour ce of knowledge, the only cr iterion 
3,4,5,6 ~, 
of t r uth. There is n\truth
7
for man beyond what he 
perceives, feels, and expe r iences. 
But, however , in sense-perception the relation of cor-
respondence between image and imaged exists only moment arily 
and is de pendent in detail on the circumstances, even the 
bodily condition, of the perceiver and 1s unique of him in 
8 
that instant. Yet this fleeting image, although only sub-
jective opinion and not objective t r uth, is true for the 
observer. There is only one tribunal of t r uth; in matters 
8 
of knowledge the perceiver 1s a law unto himself. What 
seems to him IS t nue, the only truth of whi ch he is capable: 
Of all things the measur e is Man, of things that are, 
tha t t hey are, and of things that are not, tha t they 
are not. 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 
17 
This i s the famous doc~rine of tb.e homo mansura. 
The majority of commentators have concurr ed with Aris-
totle 1n thei r interpretation of the Protagor ean homo mansura, 
1. Qf. Ferrier, Hl , II, 190. 
2. Webe r and Perry, HP, 40. 
3. Adams on, D~P, 71. 
4. Benn, GP, 74 . · 
5. Burnet, GP, 115. 
6. \1/atson, Art. ( 1907). 
7. Weber and Perry, HP, 40. 
8. Thilly, HP, 46. 
9. Freeman, APSP, 125. 
10. Ar i stotle, ~., 1053a35, 
l062b13. 
11. Benn, GP, 74. 
12. Diog. Laert., LEP, II, 463. 
13. Ferrier, PW, II, 204. 
14. Scoon, GPBP, 130. 
15. Watson, Art. (1907). 
16. Ferrier, PW, II, 189. 
17, Burnet, GP, 114 ~ ~· 
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taking it to mean that "that which seems to EACH man ••• 
1 
assuredly is." Sensatio:n, and that is the only criter-
ion of trutb. which Protagoras would admit, was a wholly 
subjective phenomenon, contingent and, of greatest im-
portance, in a vital sense unique~ the individual in-
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
voloed. 
Anothe·r interesting interpretation of the homo 
mansura is tha t Protagoras meant man in a generic rather 
10,11 
than in an individual sense. If such was the case, 
the practical consequence of a denial of objective truth 
is to make the majority tb.e arbi tara of the good and the 
bad, the ~rue and the false. Race-made truth i nvolves 
not one but seve r al criteria Of truth - custom, tradition, 
convention, consensus gentium, compulsion, and so on. 
The importance Protagoras assigned to sense-perception 
12 
made hi m an empiricist, but an empiricist unredeemed by 
any sense of the importance of the organization, systemat1-
zation, generalization, and abstraction t hat characterizes 
13,14,15 
scientific activity. Protagoras b.as also been 
16,17,18 
styled "a pragmatist before pragmatism," and witb. 
1 • .Aristotle, iviet., 
1053a35, 1062bl3. 
2. .Adamson, DGP, 71. 
3. Benn, GP, 74. 
4. Burnet, GP, 115. 
5. Ferrier, PW, II, 204. 
6. Robin, GT, 145. 
7. Watson, Art. (1907). 
8. Weber and Perry, HP, 43. 
$0. Cf. Burnet, GP, 115. 
11. Gomperz, GT, I, 450-453. 
12. Schiller, Art. ( 1911) • 
13. Burnet, GP, 107. 
14. Q!. Robin, GT, 145-146. 
15. Watson, Art. (1907). 
16. Robin, GT, 145-146. 
17. Russell, HWP, 77. 
18. Watson, Art. (1907). 
9. Freeman, PSP, 348-349. 
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justification. Yet the pragmatic, the practical element 
in his philosophy was subordinated to a more bro·ad ideal -
humanism. The whole of his philosophy and of the educa-
tional theory and practice in which he set such store was 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
directed towards the fulfilment of human ends. 
Einally, as a corollary of these humanistic sentiments·, 
Protagoras arr ived at a position, if not identical at least 
very similar to that of the conventionalis t s. He made con-
7,8 
vention, r a ther than Nature, his law. 
Relativism, tha t "false and even monstrous" manufa.c-
9 
ture of truth, so incompatible with the conviction that 
10 
"truth 'does not change," that "a principle which has any 
soundness should stand firm ncbt only now and then but al-
11 
ways and forever,'' is by far the most seri ous eharge that 
can be made against Protagoras, an accusation which he prob-
ably wo uld make little attempt to deny for relativism is in-
separable from the doctrine of homo mansura and the sensual-
- 12 
ism on which that criterion of truth was based. Fo r Pro-
tagoras practical and theoretical truth alike were purely 
relative, matters of taste, temperament, education, past ex-
perience, bodily condition, a~ varying fro m one moment, 
13 
from one individual to the next. There is no universally 
1. Benn, GP, 75. 
2. Jaeger, P, I, 300. 
3. Ritter, K4P, I, 574. 
4. Robin, GT, 145-146. 
5. Watson, Art. ( 1907). 
6. Weber and Perry, HP, 41. 
8. Burnet, GP, 117. 
9. Bradley, Art. (1911). 
10. Brightman, IP, 274. 
11. Plato, ~' 890. 
12. Watson, Art. (1907). 
13. Weber and Perry, HP, 41. 
7. Benn, GP, 73, 78. 
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valid truth·; there · are· no crit-e·ria for recogniztng · the ab-
sol uta trut\l· of any moral or metapnys 1cal · pro·posttton. 
The standard· of ·1nt·ell1gen-ce essential to· ttre establ·tsh-
ment--·o-:r- a standard o·f · t-ruth· c·annct be fixed. In other 
words, Protagoras unequivocally and irrevocably-denied 
the unive-rsality ofthe intelle-c-t, tb.e- pos·s--tb111t-y· or ab-
solute knowledge, and the existence of any criteria of 
1,2,3,4 
uncond 1t·1oned tlihltb.. 
But· Protagoras was not co·ntent to· s·tc;,·p at· this potnt. 
If the-re· is no possib111 ty of truth, 1 t requires but. little 
courage · to · go · one ste·p further and a--r f1rm that there· 1s no 
5 
possibility of falsehood. Protagoras, like · most ofthe 
other · Sophists, held tb:at there were two oppo·s ·ed sides to 
6,7 
eve-ry quest ion each equally 11 true • " The homo men sura 
has implicit in it a den·ial of the· principle of contrad1c• 
8,9 
tion. Aristotle, like Plato-, with his customary· ·sagaci-
ty quicklydetected tb:ishigbly· vunerable difficulty and 
10 
mad·e it the focus of his attack on the Sophists. 
Tb.e·re is yet anothe-r difficulty inherent in the rela-
tivism o f the Sophists. While each man's opinions are equal-
l y "true'' for him, the opinions of man are not, according tp 
Protagoras, all equally valuable, and one position may be, 
1. Ferrier, PW, II, 193. 
2. Ritter, HAP, I, 577. 
3. Watson, Art. (1907). 
4. Weber and Perry, HP, 41. 
5. Watson, Art. (1907). 
6. -- Diog. Laert, LEP, II, 463. 
7. Plato, Theae-t., 152A et ~· 
8. Freeman, PSP, 349 , 352 • 
9. Ritter, HAP, I, 577. 
10. Aristotle, Met., l005a, 
1062b, etc. 
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1,2,3,4 
if not more true, at least better than a second. 
Presumably· Protago·ras believed ··those "truths" to be batter 
which were most profitable and salutary in a given circum-
5 
stance·, and wh·1ch· were 1n accord with the convictions of 
6 
a man in a "normal" condition of body and mind. Now 
ai ther the Sophists · mu·st be arbitrarily accepted at tb.e 
repos1. torias of truth. or elsa· the common· man ba·c·omes th.a 
arizrite·r of metaphysical truth, and "average good optn1on11 
7 
has superior claims to truth. 
8 
The· major1 ty ·dtctates truth.. 
Such an interpretation of Protagoras' relat i vism is c-ompat-
ible with the fact tb.a·t neither Protagoras nor Gorgias·; un-
like- the later Sophists, extand·ed tb.air relativism ·to moral-
9,10 
ity, tradition, and other popularly establish.ed institutions. 
Tha · positiva contributions that Protagoras made to 
0 ph.ilsophy were not completely negligible. He inaugurated a 
A 
long· overdue age of critical reflection, of philosoph.1cal 
self-examination, ani he did succeed in making 1 t clear once 
and for all th.at human · understand-1ng itself was inextricably 
11 
involved in the search for truth and beality. He destroyed 
the mental foundations or the old polyth.eism, preparing the 
way for the h1gh.er creeds of Socrates and the Stoics; he ders-
troyed tb.e dogmatism or fantastic speculation and dia lectical 
extravagance, compelling thought to give an account of itself; 
1. Freeman, PSP, 348-349. 
2. Russell, WiP, 77. 
3. Schiller, Art. ( 1911). 
4. Scoon, GPBP, 131. 
5. Robin, GT, 145. 
6. Burnet, GP, 116. 
7. Watson, Art. (1907). 
8. Russell, WNP, 77. 
9. Scoon, GPBP, 131. 
10. Th1lly, HP, 46. 
11. Weber and Perry, HP, 3-4, 42. 
1 
and he · creat·ed a sai·enc·e- of language. 
But , on ·the· o·tt.e·r hand, hlJ exaggerateu· psyc·hoTogi·cral 
and· phys iologica·l difference-s bErtwe-ern indiv·iduals· while de-
11berate·ly ·overlook ing ther un1vers·al character· of human 
reas·on-· and · the- fact that satenee, by demanding· reproduo1-
b1litr, achi·eves ··an 1n telle·ctua·l un:l:versality that over·-
2,3 
comes the·se-- human d1fference1L Hie- vtew t hat language· 
4 
was little more t ·han· a collection of signs·; his neglect 
of meaning·· tn favour of verbal qutbblings made him the 
"father of t ·he whole tribe o f e r ist1cal disputants now so · 
5 
muc-h in evidence·." He was . foremos-t a.Dong t he Sopb.ts·ts, 
t he Sopn1sta· who· betrayed · the callin-g· of philos-ophy and in 
whos-e hands- · "knowledge altogether lost sight Cllf its true 
6 
purpose.'' 
Gorgias of Leontini 
A real distinct ion cannot be delineated betwe·en rel-
ativtsm and skept1c1sm. While the· relativists speak of 
relative t ruth they are, a s Parmen1des would be alert to 
point out, abusing terms. Opinion, no matter w1th ·what 
names it may be graced, remains ol!)in1on. The Soph'1s ~s did 
not have a. characteristic, organized philosophic system, 
1. Webe r and Perr y, HP, 42-43 • 
. 2. Thi·lly, HP, 48. 
3. We·ber·- and· Perr y ·, HP, 43·· 
4. Ritter; HAP , I, 586. 
5· D1og. Laert, LEP, II, 465. 
6. Marita1n, I P , 66. _. 
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1,2 
and while· some, like Protagoras, were religious agnost1·cs, 
the·y dtd, as a whole, abide· by and s upport the moral codes 
establ ts·ned· by the commun·tty. Th·e Ske-ptics, however, emerge 
more clearly as a we·ll de fined scho·o·l and, casting aside the 
last remnants or restraint, pushed relativism to ita lo·gtcal 
extreme , caring as · little for conventional moral1 ty as they 
3 
did for metapnys 1cs. Nevertheles-s ·, tb.e d1f ferences between 
the Sophists and tne Skeptics were more matters of personal 
incl ination than of any fundamental pb.ilosophical disagreement. 
Relativism is t ·hinly disguised Skepticism; the theories of Pro-
4,5,6,7 
tagoras immediately ushered in the skeptical spirit. 
The Sophist whose · tb.1 nking was most closely allied to 
8 
tb.at of the Skeptics proper was Gorgias of Leont1n1, a dis-
9,10,11 
eiple of Empedocles, and a direct and tragic produc-t 
12 
of the Eleatic school, 
ism~ This stark nihilist 
an embodiment of the worst of Soph-
1},14 
borrowed the most dangerous 
15 
elements in the erist1es of Zenoa.nd Mel1ssus and demon-
strated to his own satisfaction, not tb.at everything was 
true as Protagoras had held, but that nothi ng was true. He 
16 
held tb.at there was not truth, that nothing exists, that 
1. Benn, GP, 74. 
2 • Freeman, APSP, 126. 
9. Burnet, EGP, 201. 
10. Burnet, GP, 119. 
3. Patrick, GS, 22. 
4. Benn, GP, 426. 
5. Fuller, HGP, 244. 
6. Russell, HWP, 78. 
7. Windelband, HAP, 116. 
8. Patrick, GS, 22. 
11. Robin, GT, 99, 143. 
12. Patrick, GS, 21. 
13. Jo~l, GAP, I, 458. 
14. Scoon, GPBP, 112. 
15. Buvnet, GP, 120. 
16. Burnet, GP, 120. 
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eve·n if' the r e was anytning we could not know 1 t, and that 
even if we could know it we C·:)uld not communicate this 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
knowledge. 
Gorg1as mus t b.ave been something of a dullard, for 
in 11 prov-1ng11 tha t there is no truth he presupposes tha t 
logic, the Eleatic dialectic, is a criterion of truth. 
Skeptics, as Aristotle slyly pointed out, do not philoso-
phize; their only prope r f unction is to vegeta te. Yet 1t 
was not Gorgias' nat.ure to be content in such a passive 
(and ill paid) role. While teaching that the transmis s ion 
of truth by word s was impossible he char ged one hundr ed 
7 
minae for his lessons 1n rhetoric. He was intoxicated 
with the power or speech, "speech is a great power, which 
achieves the most 
8 
- and least f orm," 
9 
divine works by means of t he smalleSt 
anjhe compared it to a forceful abduc-11 10 
tion or a potent drug. Like the true addict he tallted 
11 ' 
for his own amusement and, despite his thoroughgoing 
12 
skepticism, was never at a lost for something to say. 
Vlhen he couldn't carr y a point by argument he won it by 
13 
ridicule. Little wonder that Plato was shocked by Gorgias' 
14 
utter disregard of the truth and his infatuation with words. 
1. Adamson, DGP, 72. 
2. Benn, GP, 80-81, 426. 
3. Burnet, GP, 120. 
4. Freeman, APSP, 127-129. 
5· Ritter, HAP, I, 583. 
6. Scoon, GFBP, 131. 
7. Butler, LHAP, I, 346. 
8. Freeman, APSP, 132. 
9. Freeman, APSP, 132. 
10. Freeman, APSP, 132. 
11. Freeman, APSP, 132. 
12. Aristotle, Rhet., 1418a34. 
13. Freeman, APSP, 138. 
14. Freeman, PSP, 365-366. 
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Gorgias said that "those who neglect philosophy and spend 
their time on ord inary studies are like those Sui tors who 
1 
desired Penelope but slept with her maids." And of these 
ttsuitors'1 the name of Gorgias comes immediately to mind. 
With this discussion of the Sophists the present 
study of pre-Socratic criteria of truth is concluded. Cer-
tainly it must be admitted that the story b.as ended in a 
minor key. From the Icarian flight of Parmenidean meta-
physics Greek epe·culat1on plunged into the dark and tur-
bulent sea of relati'vistic sophistry. Proud reason was 
brought low. Philosophy is left at its lowest ebb. The 
Sophists "believed in knowledge without believing in truth 
••• Sophi~try [ wasl not a system of ideas, but a vicious 
state of mind ••• an intellectual disease [which] imperil-
2 
led the very existence of philosophic speculation." But 
on the constructive side of the ledger: 
their criticisms of knowledge made necessary a pro-
founder study of the problem or knowledge ••• [and) 
forced philosophy to examine the thinking process it-
self and opened the way for a theory of knowledge. 
In employing all sorts of logical fallacies and soph-
lams, they made necessar y a study of the correct laws 
of thought and hastened the birth of logic ••• The 
great value of the entire Sophistic movement consis-
ted in this: it awakened. t hought and challenged phil-
osophy, religion, custom, morals, and the institutions 
based on them·, to justify themselves to reas 8n ••• 
tb.ey compel l ed philosophy to seek a cri t erion of know-
ledge ••• 3 
1. Freeman, APBP, 139. 
2. Maritain, IP, 64-67. 
3. Thilly, HP, 48-49. 
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How much poorer philosophy would be had not Socrates and 
Plato felt the urgent need to defend philosophy from the 
onslaughts of Sophism and to re-define tts goals. The 
greatest contributionrJOf the Sophists - they were both 
a foil and a stimulant to Socrates and Plato. 
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CONCLUSION 
One fact clearly emerges from even the most cursory 
examination of the foregoing pages; for the pre-Socratics 
tbe problem or truth and ita criteria gravitated about sen-
sation on the one hand and reason on the other, giving r ise 
r espectively to the empirical and rational traditions. From 
the advantage point afforded by these concluding paragraphs 
it will undoubtedly be instructive to review, by way of a 
summary, the history of preaSocratic epistemological specu-
lation in terms of these two criteriaof truth, sensation 
and reason, and placing par ticular emphasis on the limits 
of application of one or the other criterion by each or the 
several thinke r s i nvolved and comparing tbeir ·conceptions 
of the meaning of these all-important terms. 
Sensation and reason both were ingredien5s of pre-phil-
osophic speculation; the former without doubt played a dominant 
role. But pre-philosophic sensation was little more than the 
moat casual, non-critical observation; pre-philosophic reason, 
if indeed it 1s not premature to use the term "reason" at all, 
was very rudimentar y, an avoidance of flagrant paradox, always 
subordinate to sensation if the issue became crucial, a resid-
uum rationality that might be called "common sense." 
Yet before philosophy could focus on the epistemological 
problem, no more, before the genesis of truly philosophical 
speculation could occur, it was necessary for the issue to be 
simplified by the elimination, momentarily at least, of certa i n 
criteria of truth associated with prevailing religious and 
social institutions. THALES not only t ook the bold step 
forward, weaning philosophy f r om religion thus making it 
intellectual l y autonomous, but his t hought adumbrated the 
course of future empirical and rational speculation in an-
cient Greece. With Thales sensation ceased to be casual; 
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it became more careful, minute, and, most important, se-
lective. The environment of man, the natural order in which 
he f ound himself and of which he was a part, was sc r utinized 
with new devotion and with some pretension of objectivity. 
Thales was no "pure" empiricist, however; he was far from 
content with tte scattered facts of experience no matter how 
carefully gleaned. Sensation alone is inadequate; it is 
but the first r ung on the ladder of knowledge. Sensory data 
wa s the material upon which the philosopher lavished the 
power of his reason. There is no evidence that reason for 
Thal es, as, for that matter, for the remainder of the pre-
Eleatics, was a concept at all clear or subtle. Rea son for 
Thales was abstraction, for he dimly recognized that the 
proper objects o f thought must be universals rather than 
the p~Rticulars of sense-experience. It is dffficult to ima-
gine how Thales might have proceeded from the par ticular s of 
sense-experience to universals without employing inductive 
reasoning in some form, and, aga in, how he retu rned from the 
universals to explain the particulars without resorting to 
a form of deductive reasoning. But there is no unequivocal 
~~t~eAce that he was conscious of the exact details of these 
proces-ses. 
ANAXI MANDER concurr ed with Thales in principle but 
made some significant changes in s ome aspects of his mas-
ter's system. He took as his prime universal, not water, 
but the non-sensually apprehensible yet rationally mean-
1ngfiul Non-Limited thus completely removing t he proces s 
O-f abstraction from the realm of sense-experience. Anax-
imander's Non-Limited marks an important stage in the de-
ve l opment of clas•ical logic; it laid the basis for an 
exact termi nology. All of his successors fell into the 
usage of spea king of terms and their contradictories -
the Limited and the Non-Limited, Being and Non-Being, and 
so on. Thus when a more precise logic began to develope 
in the handsof the Eleatics, there already existed an exact 
and systematic terminology with which to work. Although it 
cannot be said to what extent, the contradictories of Anax-
imander, a much moee subtle doctr ine than the popular idea 
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of opposite s (contraries), suggest a recognition of the prin-
ciple of contradiction. Thales had i nsisted on universals; 
Anaxt mander took another crucial step forward in this direc-
tion; he insisted on a definite organiza tion of the universals 
and their c«anst1tuent parts, that is to say, Nat ural Law. 
With Heraclitus this Natural Law was to become the object and 
pattern of r eason, Parmenides was to identify it with reason, 
Anaxagoras was to call it Nous, and with the Atomists the con-
cept emerged as Necessity. ANAXIMENES is of note f or having 
retreated somewhat f r om the highly abstract position of Anaxi-
mander and for having organized the doctrines of his predecessors. 
The pr e-Eleatic philos-o-phers concerned themselves 
with "reason" yet there is no evidence that they had a 
clear concept of anything that might be properly called 
logiq. The PY·rHAGOREANS tried to circumvent this d iffi-
culty in a most ingenious. manner. There was one system 
of log·ic known to the pre.;..Eleatics, and that system of 
pre-logical logic was arithmetic. The Pythagoreans iden-
tified things w1 th numbers, thus hoping to bring the cos-
mos under the he-gemony of the particular "reason" known 
to them, mathematics. The Pythagoreans were not ignorant 
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of the work of the Ionian Naturalists, yet it is impossible 
to d istinguish the role · that sensation played in their phil-
osophy because early Pythagorean doctrine is confused with 
that of later Pythagoreans who were involved in the empir-
ical revival following the decline ~f Eleaticiem. Tb.e Pyth-
agoreans also subscribed to the doctr i ne of metempsychosis, 
a doctr i ne which was later to give rise to the Platonic doc-
trine of reminiscence. 
With XENOPHANES the metaphysical problems were moment-
arily defer r ed in favor of iconoclastic sallies and moral pre-
occupations. H)wever, his insistence that God is One is taken 
as the genesis of Eleaticism and certainly is not unrelated 
to the problem of truth and its criteria. Xenophanes was al~ 
sensitive to the dichotomy between knowledge and opinion, a 
distinction which was to take its ultimate form in the thought 
or Parmenides. There was a skeptical cast to Xenophanes' 
philosophy, and the 1r1ant of a reliable criterion of truth 
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(sensation was discredited, reason callow and nascent) may 
well have been rersponstble. 
HER~CLITUS, however, plunged into the very midst of 
the difficulties that vexed pre-Socratic metaphysics. 
Sense-experience presented man with a flux of appearances. 
But He r aclitus, following the clew of .Anaxima.ndefl', became 
firmly convince·d that ttlis flux occured, not randomly, but 
1n accor dance with Law. Thus Heraclitus r escued the poss i -
bility, tb.e necessary condition of universal knowledge. He 
directed his attention, not outward at the cosmos as tne 
Ionian Naturalists had d·one, but inward. He s·ought the Law 
by introspection, for, if man is a part of Nature, 
must be exemplified in him as well as around him. 
t he Law 
His 1m-
media·te goal was intuition taken in its most literal sense, 
and this insight was to provide the key, the "outsight", to 
co in a wor d, to the natural order. What are· the criteria of 
truth of the introspective· methodology? Certainly not the 
senses, although sense-experience may be an aid, for t hey 
are directed to the outer world. The Law is a rational or-
der; reason is not dependent upon externals, in fac t only 
reason can penetrate behind the external appearances pre-
sented by sense-experience. Consequently, he made reason 
or reflection his criterion of truth. But still, as in the 
case of Xenophanes, he could not describe the very faculty 
he had recommended, for there 1a again no evidence of a 
clear and adequate conception of the nature of reason. 
The lac k of a clear and adequate conception of the 
nature of rea;son was a verr great shortcoming of pre-So-
cratic thought·; it was the c·ause of a pronounced skepti-
cal tendency, and t he dtfficiency was not remedied until 
t he advent of the Eleatic School. PARMENIDES set out by 
elucida ting· the vole and realm of reason. Firstly he did 
what all his predecess ors had been reluctant to do; he 
categorically dismissed sensation as f alse, 11 The \'lay of 
Opinion. 11 He proclaimed reason to be the sole reliab1•~ 
crite r ion of truth. He did not stop here, he identified 
thought and being thus merging epistemology with ontology. 
For Heraclitus r eason had been simply the method~logy of 
introspection, for Parmenides 1t was nothing lee s than 
thought itself. It was urgent, compelling, and the only 
"Way" from which man was not str ictly debarred. Semantics 
was intimately bound to the Greek concept of reason. When 
they spoke of reason the pre-Eleatics may have . had partly 
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in mind a type of semantic analysis, and Plato's insistence 
on careful definition is a reflection of this concern. This 
semantic concept of reason rec~ived a clearer articulation 
with Parmenides, who was very concerned with words and the 
grammatical structure of language, than with any of his pred-
ecessors. Yet for all the claims Parmen1des made for reason 
he still failed, at least in the knQwn fragments o f his works, 
to say exactly what reas on was. Yes, reason is being, but 
precisely what does one do when one sits down to reason? 
Pa.rmenides' pupil, ZENO, provides the answer to this 
question, for in the fragments or his work that have been 
pre· served· the·re· are several clear and cone ise examples of 
the reasoning process - the famed paradoxes. These para-
doxes, which were constructed .. in defense of Parmenides and 
were · de·s·igned to · annthtlate hts· critics, follow the same 
pattern: a postulate is stated, it is then shown by logical 
analysts, bydaduct1on, that· tnis postulate leads to con-
clusions ·wh1cb.are manifestly absurd or contradictory, and 
t hus the original pos·ula te is demonstrably false. Rea·so·n 
has· at last matured into a precise logical methodology, 
MELISSUS, another· d isc·tple of Parmenides, tried to comple-
ment Zeno's negative dtalectic with one more positive in 
character but suce·eeded only in addling Parmenidean meta-
physics by the introduction of Ionian natural science. 
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The conclusions of Parmen1dean .. metaphysics and Zeno's 
dialectic were at odds wtth the "facts" of sense-experience, 
and this provea to be more than the successors · of the Eleattcs 
could bear. There was an almost immediate reaction against 
the dialectic and monism of the Eleatics, a. renewed interest 
in empiricism and pluralism. EMPEDOCLES recommended reason 
ana warned of tb.e dangers of ~ensation, but like the pre-Ele-
atics, whom b.e resembled 1n many ways, his conception of rea-
son was far from clear and he was obliged to relie heavily 
on empirical evidence. Bothe sensation and reason should be 
used in the pursuit of truth he asserted, but he himself de-
pend-ed on a considerable collection of empirical evidence, 
on· a variety of expe r iments of impressive ingenuity, and on 
an activity intermediate between reason and sensation, re-
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flection~ by wb:ich he seems to havemeant a. careful compara-
tiv·e study and conse·quent evaluation of available empirical 
data. Of the· basis o·f t ·he refle·cttve evaluation he is mute. 
His criterion of trut·h was the weight of empirical data. 
that he could gather dl s-upport a given tenet. It was cer-
tainly ·not reason in the Eleattc sense; it was something 
more than simply s·ensation; it was reflection. The empha-
sis Empedocles placed in sensation prompted nim to elaborate, 
much more carefully than had any of his predecessprs, a 
theory of the actual mechanism ·of sense-perception. This 
th.eory- was · that of homoeopath1sm, and its elucidation cul-
minates in most concrete and articulate form a whole vein 
of pr·~;:.:socrattc epistemological speculation. 
ANAXAGORAS transformed the Heraclitean concept of Law 
into the doctrine of Nous, an idea pregnant with potentiali-
ty and most i ntimately related to . the problem of truth and 
its· criteria, but an ide·a which, much to the dispair of 
Plato and Aristotle, .Anaxagoras then proceeded to ignore. 
He praised reason, he hinted at a connection between human 
and universal intelligence, he even suggested that reason 
was a process of analogical generalization by which it was 
possibl• to ~xeeed the limits of sensory experience, but, 
rather than developing any of these fine ideas, he fell back 
t o an empiricism very similar to that of Empedocles. 
With Empedocles and Anaxagoras the formative period of 
Greek speeulation drew to its conclusion. Its principle 
accomplishments were (1) the recognition of the universal 
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and immut able nature of truth (Thales, Anaximander, Heracli-
tus), (2) the recognition that sensory data are the material, 
not the end, of human knowledge (Thales), (3) the ccncept of 
Natural Law (Anaximander, Heraclitus), (4) teleology (Anaxa-
goras), (5) the ideal of scientific objectivity (Thales) and 
tbe recogn i tion or the role and interpreta tion or careful 
scientific experimenta tion (Empedocles), (6) the distinction 
between knowledge and opinion (Xenophanes, Parmenides), (7) 
andaccurate yet flexible, inherently logical philosophic term-
inology and. an awareness of the relation between semantics 
and reason (Anaxima.nder, Par menides), ( 8) three workable 
logical systems - the inductive analogical generalization or 
the naturalists (Thales, Anaxago r as, Anaximander, Anaximenes, 
Empedocles), the mathematical theory of the Pythagoreans, and 
the deductive dialectic (Par men1des, Zeno) - as well as an 
appreciation of the power and scope of logical methodology 
( Parmenides), and ( ~) two epistemological t heories - the 
• Pythagorean doctrine or metempsychosis and reminiscence and 
the doctrine of homoeopath1sm, the latter ranging from, most 
generally, a paral l elism between the human i nttllect and the 
nature of things (Heraclitus, Anaxagoras) to, most specifical-
ly, Empedocles' detailed htheory of the nature of the sensory 
mechanism. But these many achievements were not an unmixed 
blessing, for their very number and diversity gave rise to a 
philosophical discouragement, a. feeling that philosophy had 
become a tower of Babel, tha t there was no universal truth 
but merely the opinions of the philosophers. The Gr eek genius 
A second response to philosophy's difficulties, which 
really wa s no response at all but rather an admission of 
failure, was SOPHISM. Sensation as a criterion of truth had 
persisted and .prospered even in the face of the onslaughts 
of reason; its prestige ~Dr all the attacks upon it had been 
but little damaged. The Sophists assumed that sensation was 
the only source of knowledge - an idea sometimes attributed 
t o Democritus. But the senses present to each man an Hera-
clitean flux that is conditioned by his own unique disposition. 
Truth is not objective and universal but completely subjective; 
each man is the measure of t r uth for himself, if not the indi-
vidual man, then at least the community. While the more mo-
dest relativists like PROTAGORAS, possibly out of expedience, 
were willing to abide by the dictates of tradition, other 
Sophists of a more skeptical cast such as GORGIAS refused to 
recognize even this criterion of truth, indeed, they rashly 
asserted that there was no truth (rather paradoxically as-
suming the Eleatic dialectic true in order to prove their 
point). With the Sophists philosophy almost lost its in-
tegrity. The pbilosop h1c quest was abandoned; practical ends 
became the orde r of the day. Even the Elea tic dialectic was 
perverted and made the tool of insincere eristics and rhet-
orical and forensic mischief. But for all the damage they 
d id to philosophy, the Sophists also extended to it an in-
valuable and exceedingly timely service. The pre-Socratic 
spirit was intoxicated by its own power and accomplishment, 
and one of the dangerous aspects of its exuberance was the 
lack of sober criticism. The Sophists launched this needed 
criticism with devastating results. They really posited 
the epistemological question; ho ilianger would 1t be pos-
sible to approach the problem of truth and its criteria 
without constant attention to the ~ole played by the human 
intellect itself in the search for truth. Like the material-
istic tradition, the Sophistic tradition, relativistic and 
skeptical, has remained lively. 
The Sophists had aggravated the problems of philoso-
phy and were ready to monopolize upon these problems. It 
remained for the genius of PL&TO to reinstate and re-vital-
ize philosop~ic speculation. His was the monumental task 
of establishing, in ado ition to the validity, the value of 
of philosophy, and for this great vocation he drew heavily 
on pre-Socratic sources. He was haunted ontologically by 
the Heraclitean flux, epistemologically by the Protagorean 
relativism; nor would he have anything to do with the mater-
ialistic "solution" of Democritus. From the Pythagoreans 
he drew his doctrine of reminiscence and fondness for num-
erology, numbe r s may also have suggested the realm of ideals 
to him; from Anaximander a ':id Heraclitus he drew his convic-
tion in a universal or der; from Parmen1des the knowledge 
that the universal order is r a tional; from Anaxagoras the 
suggestion that this order was purposeful; with Xenophanes 
~nd his own teacher, Socrates, he shared, yet much more lu-
cidly, the insight that this purpose f ul unive r sal order must 
be ultimately good; and he was furthermore deeply impressed 
with the cogency of tbe Eleatic dialectic and its ability to 
lead part way up the ladder of knowledge. 
The fourth response to the problems of pre-Socra tic 
philosophy wa s the system of ARISTOTLE, whose massive gen-
ius assimila ted all previous philosophy, who in the best 
sc hoolmasterly manner si f ted the wheat from the chaff, and 
who, fro m the raw material provided by prior speculation, 
constructed a vast, intellectual edifice that was broadly 
expository yet analytic, s ynoptic yet oriented, minute in 
its par ticulars yet grand in scheme, eclectic yet bearing 
ever ywhere the unmistakable stamp of his unique and colos-
sal i n tellect. 
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